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1.  Introduction 
The  policy discussion of the 1970s  bas been centered on  the  contr~l 
of inflation and  the principal point of view which has  guided the discussion 
is the monetarist proposition that there is trade-off between wages  and 
employment,  that is high wages'  price people out of jobs'  and  hence  cause 
unemployment  (high wages  being equivalent to high unit labour costs).  At 
the  same  time productivity growth has been slow  compared with previous post 
war  trends,  even making  allowance for  'normal'  cyclical movements,  and  labour 
mobility has been very  low.  Increasingly the economic  orthodoxy has been 
attributing both high wages  and  low  productivity to the failure of markets 
to adjust due  to rigidities and  there bas been growing  support  for  supply-
side policies aimed  at increasing the efficiency of market mechanisms. 
But macro  economic  analysis of the 1970s  has been unsatisfactory.  The 
relationship between employment  and  output is generally conceived as  a 
derived demand  for  labour and  is postulated for  the economy  as a  whole 
as if there were  a  single representative firm.  The  analysis at the 
macroeconomic  level  therefore parallels the analysis of  the micro-economic 
level.  There has been little discussion of how  macroeconomic  aggregates, 
such as  average wages,  the level of employment  and  aggregate productivity, 
and  their interaction, may  be influenced by  heterogeneous behaviour of the 
individuals,  groups  and  establishments which  comprise  the aggregate.  The 
overriding belief is in the view that the economy  system should be made  to 
correspond as  far as possible with the theoretical model.  While heterogeneity 
and  the existence of rigidities in market adjustments  are accepted,  they are 
treated as  factors  in general exogenous  to  the economic  system determined by 
the social and  political system in which  they are found. - 2  -
In this paper we  shall discuss  the nature of rigidity in the  economic 
system,  particularly as it affects  the  level of  employment,  and  pay 
attention to  the origins of  these rigidities.  Of  particular importance 
are the interaction between social, political and  institutional factors 
such  as  collective bargaining,  employment  legislation and  the  economic 
factors  to create and  maintain rigidities.  But  there is a  perceived 
need  for  flexibility in the use  of  labour,  not only posited by economic 
theory but also strongly felt by management  as  essential for  the 
preservation and  improvement  of  competitiveness.  These needs may 
arise for  cyclical reasons or as  a  response to a  more  general decline in 
the  level of activity and  may  be desired  in order to shift the burden 
of adjustment  onto  labour or they may  have more  explicit political 
motivation.  By  examining  the  sources  of flexibility and  the levels of 
organisation at which it can be  achieved,  we  seek to  show  the conflicts 
inherent  in  imposing market  adjustments  in the real world. 
Economic  development  has  generally increased  the flexibility of  labour 
costs because of  the growing  size and  complexity of methods  of production 
and  institutions.  However  the changing boundary between flexibility 
andrigidityin the market  position of  labour has  been the consequence 
of  changing social organisation,  political attitudes and  assertion 
of managerial  prerogative under  pressure from real wages,  the level 
and  conditions of  employment  and  the  system of  social welfare.  Seen 
in these terms,  the  1970s,  when  growing  incertainty has  increased  the 
risks associated  with fixed  labour costs,  can be regarded  as  a  period 
of social  and  political crisis  because social attitudes and  institutional 
forms  no  longer  permit  the degree of flexibility in the use of  labour 
which  is required by  individual firms. 
Supply side policies to  improve  productivity,  changes  in social 
security systems  to  increase the  incentive to work  at  lower wages, 
reductions  in the so-called  'monopoly  power'  of trade unions  to undermine - 3  -
wage  levels  and  lower  the costs of  hiring and  firing labour,  measures 
to  reduce  employment  protection to increase  the vulnerability of women 
in the labour  force  and work-sharing  to  lower  the  incidence of full-time 
unemployment  and  spread  the  incidence of unemployment  are all policies 
which are aimed  at  improving  competitiveness  through  lpwering  labour 
costs  and  increasing profitability.  The  belief in the primacy  of  the 
profit motive is based  on  a  belief in the  success of that motive  in 
achieving  growth of real national  income  and will be misplaced if the 
level of conflict over the allocation of real national  income  between 
wage  earners,  dependent  population and  capitalists rises  and  if the market 
opportunities for  renewed  expansion are either not forthcoming or not 
taken.  The  question of flexibility in the use  of  labour or in output 
levels and  product  range is central to  the debate as  to what  are 
appropriate policies in the  labour market  and  the workplace to 
accompany  the macroeconomic  policy strategy and,  while we  shall not 
be discussing the merits of alternative strategies in this paper, 
it is important  to recognise that the analysis  presented here is in 
conflict with a  number  of strategies currently proposed and  raises 
major  objections  to the structure of  those strategies:  if the normal 
process of eocnomic  development is one  in which  social and  industrial 
organisation has  a  significant role to play and  a  strong interaction 
with economic  conditions,  macroeconomic  aggregates  such as  average 
wages,  and  price inflation and  the level of  employment  are not 
well-defined targets whose  outcomes  are to be supplemented by  a  package 
of liberal measures  outside the market  to ameliorate  the social 
consequences  of  these  outcomes. - 4 -
Flexibility of  labour costs 
Economists  have  traditionally regarded  labour as  a  variable factor 
of production and  would  expect unit labour costs  to be  independent 
of  the  level of output.  The  observation that this is not  the case  and 
that when  adjusted for  trend productivity growth unit  labour costs move 
counter-cyclically have  led many  economists  to conclude that firms 
board labour  (  ).  However,  despite the attention paid  to  the 
labour  'hoarding'  phenomenon  there ~no readily available systematic 
analysis  as  to why  labour cost per unit of output varies widely. 
From  the employer's  standpoint  labour cost would  be  completely 
variable  if the  input of  labour effort to  the  firm was  directly 
linked  to the  level of output  and  if the payment  for  that effort was 
indexed  to the price of the firms  product.  This  theoretical ideal  could 
only be  achieved if the  firms  could continuously adjust its labour 
force  in line with its demand  and  if the movement  of the price of its 
product was  the  same  as  the movement  of all other prices.  A less extreme 
definition would  be  that  labour costs were variable if averaged  over 
some  normal  planing period  the firm could adjust its labour force  in line 
with  the  demand  for its services.  However  an examiniation of the issue 
shows  that for  technical,  organisational, institutional and  legal 
reasons at least part of  the cost of  labour to the firm is fixed 
irrespective of output  so  that unit labour costs vary. 
Reason  for  labour fixity 
a.  Technical 
Labour  is essentially a  complement  to capital rather than a  substitute 
as  generally assumed  by  conventional  theory.  This  is not  to  s~y that 
labour is completely invariate with respect  to capital equipment but 
that there is a  minimum  level of  labour  input associated with a  given 
te~hnique and  so unless capital equipment  can be adjusted easily to - 5  -
output then neither can labour.  The  extent to which capital  equipment 
can be varied with output varies widely both in terms  of the vintage 
of  the machine  and  its output.  In a  clothing firm it is quite easy to 
reduce direct labour in line with output as one  person operates  one 
sewing machine.  On  the other hand,  in a  textile factory where  one  person 
operates  a  high speed  loom  capableofalarge quantity of output and  in 
a  steel works  operating a  large blast furnace with a  wide range of outputs 
but a  fixed minimumcrew,  labour costs to the firm are less flexible. 
But  fixity of costs is not  confined to direct labour.  The  size of 
the maintenance ~itters, electrician etc.)  and  ancilliary  (crane 
drivers, transport etc.)  labour force is only partly dependent  on  the 
level of output. 
b.  Organisational 
Organisational  factors which operate at the  level of  individual 
companies  or establishments  include managerial  and  other staff costs. 
In the operation of  any business activity,  there are a  number  of  tasks 
which are not directly related to production.  These will include 
finance,  marketing,  personnel and  stock control, both of  raw materials 
and  finished  goods,  all of which  are in some  part related to the 
size of  the establishment as  a  business venture rather than to its 
day-to-day level of activity.  Management,  and  its associated office 
staff, are generally part and  parcel of the establishment  unit and 
are only likely to  change with major decisions on  the  'normal' 
level of activity.  Other non-manual  staff,  such as  catering and  cleaning 
employees  and  secretarial services,  and  manual  workers who  are not direct 
production workers,  such as  those in despatch,  may  be regarded as 
overheads  in relation to production but may  be more  closely related to 
through part of  the number  of direct production employees,  and  hence 
more  variable in numbers  as  the level of activity alters. - 6  -
c.  Hiring and  training 
The  cost of hiring and  training staff depends  on  the net acquisition 
to  the  labour force  and  its training and  retraining,  both of which  can 
be  regarded as  related closely to output,  and  labour  turnover,  which 
is not.  A high percentage of the training a  firm provides will be 
in specific skills and  this  investment will be  embodied  in the labour 
force.  The  need  a  firm has  to recover its investment  in training and 
secure  a  reasonable rate of return means  that it has motives  for 
retraining the  labour force whichare independent  of current output 
levels  (  ).  This  quasi-fixed factor status of labour is 
enhanced by  the fact  that workers  also embody  the benefits of learning 
by  doing  and  that the  firm.  is a  social as well  as  a  technical 
organisation.  Investment  in specific skills enhanced by experience 
and  knowledge  of  the firms  technical and  social organisation places  a 
premium  on  long service staff which is independent  of current output 
levels. 
d.  Fixed  labour costs 
Firms  also face  expenses  associated with employing  labour which 
are  independent  of its productive activities.  These  include  the cost 
of  social security contribution  (both state and  private),  insurance, 
the maintainence of health and  safety standards,  statutory right to 
minimum  periods  of notice of dismissal  and  other measures  to protect 
employment  and  redundancy  and  other forms  of  severence payments.  It 
is also possible to  include in this category fringe benefits  such as 
sports  and  social and  other welfare provisions  (for example medical 
and  dental  service). - 7 -
e.  Institutional 
The  institutional constraints on  the flexibility of  labour  costs 
are usually associated with collective bargaining between  employers 
and  trade unions.  Parts of the agreements  are  concerned with minimum 
conditions,  such as minimum  time rates  and  piece rates,  guaranteed working 
weeks  and  guaranteed weekly earnings.  Other parts of  the  agreement 
impose  such  terms  as  agreed manning  levels,  demarcation between skills, 
holidays  (with holiday pay agreement),  the normal working week  and 
guaranteed  payments  for non-productive  time  for  payment  by result workers. 
Agreements  may  also specify sick pay  and  occupational or company  pension 
schemes.  Finally  agreements  may  impose  restrictions on  lay-offs, 
provide for  a  guaranteed working week  to limit short-time working  and 
lay down  procedures  for  agreeing and  implementing redundancies. 
These  agreements  therefore limit  the flexibility  that individual 
employers  may  have over  their total cost.  Agreements  are also made 
over rates of pay,  the make-up  of pay  (including various  payment-by-
results  schemes,  other incentive schemes,  bonuses  and  attendance 
allowances)  and  prices for  overtime and  shiftworking.  The  type of 
shifts to be worked,  such as night shift,  twilight shifts,  double  day 
shifts and  'continental'  three-shift systems,  are also likely to be  the 
subject of negotiation. 
Collective bargaining is about  the distribution of  income  but it 
also  embodies  the conflicting attitudes of  employers  and  their workers 
to  employment.  Within the constraints of  the need  to maintain an 
efficient workforce which,  for  the reasons  discussed above,  may  necessitate 
a  certain fixity of  labour costs,  an  important  concern of  employers 
will be  to maintain a  flexibility of  labour costs with respect  to both 
output  and  product prices.  By  contrast labour organisation will  include 
amongst  their objective  securing and  majntaining job security 
establishing  'property rights'  to skill and  to the operation of  certain - 8  -
machines  and  the working of particular materials;  and  income  security 
in terms  of  the cost of  living.  Collective agreements will necessarily 
be  a  compromise  between the objectives of employers  and  those of  the 
employed. 
In general  terms  the more  effective the organisation of  labour 
the greater will be  the fixity of  labour costs.  However  it is unlikely 
that  trade unions will be able  to establish terms  and  conditions of 
employment  completely independently of product market  circumstances  and 
more  general economic  conditions.  Specific examples  of  the response  of 
trade unions  to diffP.rent  economic  and  institutional environments 
will be  cited in the next  section.  Here  our attention will be  concentrated 
on  the more  general question of  the  impact  of  the institutional 
determination of wages  and  conditions  of  employment. 
The  impact  of collective bargaining  depen~partly on  the level at 
which negotiations  take place and  the effectiveness by which  agreements 
are  implemented.  Traditionally in Britain in manufacturing industries 
and  other areas minimum  wages  and  other conditions of work  have been 
fixed  by national bargaining.  The  implementation of  these minima, 
the extent to which  they have been exceeded  and  the successful  imposition 
by workers  of working rules  (demarcation,  seniority etc.) have ~epended 
on  local bargaining.  This  two  tier system is in sharp  contrast with 
the collective bargaining structure in,  say,  the US  where  company  bargaining 
is the norm. 
However  in Britain there has  been a  general movement  towards 
company  and  plant bargaining and  agreements with more  comprehensive 
coverage and,  in particular,  a  more  formal  establishment of working 
rules  and  pay  and  employment  structure more  closely tailored to  the 
firms  needs.  The  tendency therefore has  been  an  increasing separation 
between the  firms  labour  force  and  the external  labour market  and  the 
growth  of  'internal labour markets'  whereby  workers  advancement - 9  -
depends more  on their position in the firms  than  in the external  labour 
market. 
The  development  of  internal  labour markets  has  been variously 
interpreted.  Doeringer and Piore explained  the  structuring of markets 
in terms  of  the specific skills and  construction of  employment 
required for  modern  technology.  Radicals  saw  such developments  as ways 
by which capital controlled labour  (  ).  Other  authors  have 
emphasised  the  importance of  labour organisation in securing control of 
entry to secure priviledged access  to employment  opportunities and  to 
form  a  basis for effective organisation.  In this latter case  the 
vertical divisions  in the labour market  from plant,  company  and  industrial 
organisation serve  a  similar function  to the more  traditional horizontal 
craft divisions. 
However  the existence of internal labour markets are explained, 
it is generally recognised that a  secondary  labour market  exists where 
wages  are  low  and  employment  systems unstable.  This  is explained 
by Doeringer  and  Piore and  the Radicals  in terms  of quality of  the 
labour.  However  institutional explanation of  labour market  structures 
emphasise  the  importance of restriction of entry on  the demand  side and 
non-competing  groups  on  the supply side in explaining the existence of 
low  paid sectors.  By  this latter argument  low  pay measures  the relative 
disadvantage  in the  labour market  rather  than relative quality. 
The  different explanations  for  the structuring of  labour market 
provide alternative answers  to questions  about  the fixity.  Fixity 
of wage  costs are explained by Doeringer  and  Piore by the use  of 
modern  technology  and  the higher degree  and  specification of  associated 
skills.  Radical explanatiorsexplain  internal  labour market  organisation 
in  terms  of  successful capitalist strategies and  hence  argue  that  these 
are methods  by which  fixity of  labour cost are exchanged  for  enhanced 
labour control.  The  trade union control explanations suggest that the - 10  -
cause  of wage  rigidities lies in collective agreement but also suggest 
that  the existence of  sections of  the  labour  force  excluded  from  the 
primary sector not by their quality but by  the  lack of organisation 
provides ways  by which  labour costs can be made  flexible if firms  can 
shift their labour market  location towards  the  secondary sector or 
sub-contract  a  part of its production there. 
Control  of wages  and  conditions  in the  secondary sector of 
the  labour market poses  special problems.  In Britain the  switch 
towards  company  bargaining has  been accompanied  by  the collective 
agreements  specifying minimum  earnings  levels for  a  normal working 
week.  Wage  increases are awarded  only to  those workers with earnings 
less  than their minima.  However  these minima  are considerably lower 
than average  earnings  and  only apply  in those areas which  are most 
weakly  organised.  It is also  to be  expected  that  these  are  the  areas 
where  trade unions  find it least easy to  impose  other  forms  of control 
and  consequently where  labour costs are most flexible.  The  pattern of 
low  minimum  wages  and  conditions  of work  and  little active organisation 
is repeated  in those areas  covered by  legal minimum  wages  in Britain 
but here  the minima  are generally significantly lower  than  those 
established by  collective agreement  and  unions  play no  significant 
role.  in enhancing the minima  or establishing other  forms  of  control. 
There  can be little doubt  that institutional factors  are 
important in increasing the fixity of employment  cost.  However  this 
effect is not universal  and  it is possible  to  rank firms  and  industries 
ranging  from  the most  effectively organised  in which  labour costs are 
fixed  almost  entirely by  agreement  to  thosewhere there is no  effective 
organisa.tion and,subject  to very  low minimum,labour  costs are unilaterally 
determined  by  management. - 11  -
Thus  it is to  be  expected that at any  one  time  a  firm will have 
a  fixed  complement  of workers  more  or less  independent of  the  level of 
output.  The  proportion of  labour costs which are fixed will depend  on  the 
technical,  organisational,  legal and  institutional factors  discussed 
above.  But  the operation of  these factors  are not  independent of  the 
product  and  labour market  environment  in which the  firm operates  and 
the  incidence of  the various  factors  fixing  labour costs varies widely 
between firms,  industries and  through  time.  These  differences are 
explored  in the next  section and  the following  section considers ways 
by which flexibility of  labour  costs is increased. - 12  -
Variation in the flexibility of labour costs 
The  extent  to which  a  firm will require flexibility in its labour 
force will depend  on  the  type of product,  scale of production,  the 
division of labour and  the degree of specialisation of the  labour force. 
A simple example will illustrate the  importance of these variables. 
Suppose  a  firm produces a  1000  pairs of sock per normal working week  in 
an  equal number  of 10  different styles using  10  machines  each capable of 
producing  100  pairs of  complete  socks  in a  week.  If each operative is 
completely specialised in the production of one  style the  firm would 
need  100  workers working  1/10 of a  week  each.  If, however,  the firm 
produced  one  style or if the workers  could  produce any style 10  workers 
could be  employed  full time.  An  alternative form of organisation would 
be  to design machines  to specialise in one  stage of production.  If it 
were 
is assumed  there  I  10  stages of production and  each  stage was  capable 
of  1000  components  per week  of any  style the  firm could meet  its output 
target with  10  workers working full time. 
If the assumption of  fixed  output is dropped  and we  suppose  that 
output falls to 900  it can be  shown  that the method  adopted by  the  firm 
to adjust its labour force will differ according to the degree of 
specialisation and  the division of labour.  To  reduce direct labour 
costs in line with output  the firm could:  reduce  the hours worked  where 
workers were  specialised in the production of  one  style of  complete 
socks,  and where  division of  labour had been applied  to the  sock 
production but would  have  the  choice of short  term working or reducing 
the  labour force by  one  in the case where  non-specialised workers 
produced  complete  socks or where  the firms  specialised in one  style of 
socks. - 13  -
However  it is unrealistic to assume  that the division of  labour 
would yield no  benefits in the  form of  increased efficiency.  If this was 
the case  the  firm would  reject this form  of production whenever  there 
were  any  fixed costs of production and where  demand  was  uncertain -
because as  the division of  labour fixed  the size of the  labour force 
unit costs would  be  inversely related to the  level of output.  If we 
assume  that with a  higher degree  of division of  labour the  firm would 
use  less labour  then  the firm would  trade off the increased risk of  the 
fixity of  labour costs against a  lower  cost of production at full 
capacity operation. 
The  introduction of production line methods  also  increases the 
inflexibility because unless production is increased sufficient to 
operate  the new  method at full capacity  labour costs would  rise unless 
the  firm could hire labour on  terms  other than a  fixed  normal week  and 
without  fixed.costs. 
So  far  the discussion has been  confirmed  to process workers but  the 
argument  advanced  above  apply with equal force  to ancilliary,  service 
and  administrative staff.  The  potential fixity of cost will vary 
inversely with strength of  the  link with output  and directly with  the 
degree of specialisation of skill in terms  of  the firms  total demand  for 
different types of skills.  The  rest of this section will illustrate the 
operation of  the various factors contributing to the fixity or otherwise 
of labour costs. 
a.  types of products  and  systems of production. 
There are many  products where  specification and  design  vary 
considerably.  Construction is an  important  example where  the  range  of 
activity varies from  custom built housing  in bulk to special civil - 14  -
engineering projects such as  dams,  power  stations and  even office 
building.  Firms  tend  to specialise  (for example,  some  firms  are solely 
concerned with repair and  maintenance)  but, particularly for  those  firms 
dealing with  large scale projects,  jobs will be  one off and  the 
production side transitory.  To  maintain continuity of  emplo}rment  would 
require  a  careful scheduling of projects even if the building industry 
employed workers with generalised building industry skills.  In fact 
some  considerable degree of  the division of  labour has been applied  to 
building and  the  labour force  is characterised by  a  wide  range of highly 
specialised crafts and  loosely integrated production stages.  The 
process of production consists of  the planning,  site preparation,  main 
construction and  finishing  and  each  stage is subdivided into specialist 
tasks  each of which is required  for  a  short period of  the total 
construction period.  Consequently construction activity is frequently  a 
set of  fragmented  tasks  so  that  the major problem may  be  one  of 
co-ordinating the production process in terms of  a  sequence of tasks 
often carried out  separately by  independent  contractors.  On  the other 
hand,  there is sufficient overlap between projects for  firms  to maintain 
a  core of permanent  employees  and  the  tendency  to do  so has been 
reinforced by  the  growth of  standardised  components.  Nevertheless  the 
nature of construction industry  produc~ and  the process  of production 
requires  a  high degree  of  labour force  flexibility which is achieved by 
temporary  employment  or the  employment  of specialised sub-contractors 
who  can  only permanently  employ  their workers  by  carrying out 
construction tasks  on  a  succession of sites. 
Shipbuilding provides an  example of  a  system of  labour organisation 
with problems  analogous  to those of building and  construction.  Ships - 15  -
are large one off products with a  long planning and  gestation process 
and  the process of production is typified by specialists in skills. 
However  shipbuilding is localised in shipyards  and  the extent of 
continuous  employment  depends  on  the size of  the yard - i.e.  the number 
of  ships which  can be  constructed at one  time  - and  the degree of 
specialisation. 
One  important difference between  shipbuilding and  construction is 
the higher degree of unionisation in the  former.  In Britain the 
structure of unionisation in shipbuilding reflects high division of 
labour typical of nineteenth century  shipbuilding methods.  This  and  the 
temporary nature of shipbuilding employment  led to a  system of 
vigorously enforced demarcation rules which has reinforced crafts 
specialisation and  hence  the  temporary nature of employment  and  the 
problems  of  labour inflexibility.  Other countries employ  less 
specialised workers with general shipbuilding skills and  their greater 
inter-change-abilities between  tasks makes  labour costs more  flexible 
and  employment  more  permanent. 
Mechanical engi.neering provides  a  useful contrast to construction 
and  shipbuilding.  Mechanical engineering consists of both long  runs  of 
standard products and  a  considerable number  of short  runs  on  one off 
products  and  generally components  are produced for assembly  into a  wide 
range of products.  But  here  the  components  are relatively small and 
both the  components  and  the machine  tools used  for their production are 
versatile and  so  the  problem of adjusting the  labour force  to demand  is 
less acute  than  in shipbuilding and  construction. 
Steel production and oil refinery stand at the opposite end  of  the 
spectrum producing  a  continuous  flow of homogeneous  productson  a  very - 16  -
large scale with closely integrated processes.  In this case  the  labour 
force,  at least that part directly involved  in production,  is largely 
independent  of the  level of output. 
Adjustment  to  changes  in demand  and  competitive conditions. 
Differences in products and  processes of production may  therefore 
necessitate flexible access  to skills from  the external labour market, 
have differential impacts  on  occupations within the  firm and  require 
individual operators to be  capable of a  wide variety of tasks  even if 
the  level of output  remains  constant.  But  through  time demand  will 
change  and  may  fluctuate widely  and  in competitive conditionsfaced  by 
the  firms will also  vary~  Adjustments  to  such  changes  can  take  the  form 
of changes  in the size and  structure of firms  and  industries in which 
case  the effect on  labour costs would  be more  indirect or firms  could 
directly effect labour by  adopting for example,  new  forms  of labour 
organisation,  changing  payments  systems  and  adopting different 
techniques of production. 
a.  Changes  in structure of firms  and  industries 
OveT  an  industry as  a  whole,  where  different  firms  specialise in 
products with different cyclical patterns of demand,  the number  of firms 
may  vary or the allocation of  demand  between firms  may  change.  Large 
firms  may  be also able·to subcontract peaks  in demand  to smaller firms 
who  become  increasingly vulnerable to closure when  demand  declines.  The 
effect of subcontracting is to permit  the large firm to operate at a 
generally higher and  stable level of capacity utilisation by  putting out 
excess demand  and  concentrating production on  its own  plant as demand 
declinesfuus~iding the  cost of adjusting its capacity to  fluctuations 
in demand.  However  sub-contracting is one  of many  ways  by which  a  firm - 17  -
may  externalise the costs of adjusting to changed  demand.  In  the 
product market,  firms may  seek to produce only  to order,  thus 
translating the costs of carrying stock into uncertainty of supplies for 
wholesalers or retailers and waiting  time  for  the final buyer.  Firms 
with a  sufficient degree of monopsony  in markets  for  components  may 
order only  to need,  thus eliminating stockholding and  reduce  the  speed 
of  payment,  thus transferring costs  and  uncertainty to the suppliers. 
A firm might also  achieveconsiderable flexibility in operation by 
producing a  wide  range of products.  A diversified product  range,  for 
example  spanning mass  produced  standard products  and  quality products 
produced in small batches,  provides  the establishment with  the opportunity 
to  cross-subsidise its activities and  remain  in operation.  In general, 
such  an  organisation of production would  require flexibility in the use 
of  labour of  the  types discussed  but where  the products  require 
common  tasks,  such as  a  range of different quality footwear, 
diversifica~ion of products may  be a  way  of utilising inherent 
flexibility in the  labour force. 
Product  innovation on  a  major scale generally requires a  flexible 
use of  labour but  the ability to  innovate  through  the modificationof 
existing designs may  well be a  source of operating flexibility not 
requiring changes  in employment.  Organisation of production geared 
towards  this process of product modification may  be  accompanied  by  a 
technology  (for example,  numerically controlled machines or computer 
aided design)  which  facilitates a  flexible use  of  labour by achieving 
the flexibility through mechanical means  and  limiting the flexibility 
required of  the  labour employed. - 18  -
The  firm may  also increase flexibility in operation by  retaining 
machinery  even after it has been  technically superceded.  The 
co-existence within  the  firms  of machinery  of different vintages 
provides  flexibility in the boom,  the firms using  the relatively 
obsolete machinery as  reserve capacity,  or even  in the  slump,  because 
the cost of operating less efficient plant at full capacity will be 
lower  than operating more  efficient plant below its full potential.  In 
footwear  firms  reduced  the costs of operations by  buying obsolete 
machinery at very  low  prices and  ending  leasing arrangements  for more 
modern  equipment  thereby eliminating high overhead costs.  The  transfer 
of individuals between machines  of different vintage may  lead  to  lower 
average weekly  earnings,  and  hence  the benefits of such  change  may 
require flexibility in pay  systems. 
For  an  industry,  the mix  of firms using high and  low  level 
technology may  provide a  flexibility in the use  of labour not possible 
within  individual establishments.  Firms  employing high level technology 
are generally large and  have well organised labour forces  covered by a 
number  of collective agreements  on  pay  and  conditions.  The  existence of 
a  secondary tier of firms  requires either the availability of  low  cost 
labour  (generally unorganised)  in order to  compete  in the  same  product 
market  or a  complementary product market  dependent  on  subcontract work 
from  large  firms  or specialised products  such as high quality ranges. 
Levels  of skill and  productivity may  be  as high in the  low  technology 
firms  but their survival frequently  depends  on  the ability of the 
employers  to operate with  lower rates of  labour cost.  One  way  of 
achieving this would  be  to subcontract highly skilled work  to avoid  the 
necessity of  employing workers  on  a  full  time basis at skilled rates but - 19  -
onlyutilisingthem part-time on  skilled work. 
Flexibility in operation can  therefore be  secured by  large  firms 
using  the  small firms  sector to provide flexibility in the production of 
final products and  the  supply of  components  thereby maintaining more 
stable levels of production and  shifting risk.  The  achievement  of 
similar results  is  allowed by  changes  in the mix  of products and 
productive  techniques.  The  primary sector therefore in practice uses 
the  secondary productive sector as a  hedge against uncertainty and  this 
is made  the more  effective if thecore  sector has  access  to groups  in 
the  labour market  not  covered by  employment  legislation or collective 
agreements,  either directly - by  changes  in the pattern of hiring and 
firing- or indirectly by  sub-contracting to  finmemploying  such 
workers.  By  exploiting the  labour market  disadvantage of groups  such as 
women,  immigrants,  young  people and  pensioners,  firms  may  achieve more 
flexibility in the level of employment,  particularly in relatively 
unskilled occupations,  when  faced with risk and uncertainty shifted to 
them by other firms. 
The  advantages of the availability of groups  in a  weak  bargaining 
position is not necessarily confined  to employers.  Primary workers  can 
retain their status in an uncertain world if the cost of adjustment is 
mainly carried in the  secondary  sector.  Indeed  the existence of a 
secondary sector may  be  an  important  element  in securing primary 
employment  conditions.  The  securing of agreement  between well organised 
workers  and  their employers is made  all the easier if it is possible to 
displace  some  or all of the  cost of  the  agreement  to  a  third party.  In 
this respect  one  of  the most  significant features  of  the development  of 
the German  labour market  in the 1970's in conditions of  growing - 20  -
unemployment  is the  increasing expulsion  from  primary  employment  sectors 
of  immigrants,  women,  the disabled,  the young  and  the old.  This has 
been partly achieved by raising hiring standards by insisting on  higher 
levels of qualification but  there is no  evidence of  a  proportional 
increase in the skill contents of jobs.  (Sengenber,  Kuhl  1981). 
However  although  the existence of an unorganised  and  disadvantageci 
sector of the  labour market  may  provide a  sponge  to absorb risk and  the 
effects of collective bargaining,  the  continued existence of a  large 
secondary sector poses  a  continuous threat to  the organised sector, 
particularly in a  period of prolonged  unemployment  when  the benefits to 
the  firm of primary  employment  conditions which  ~uarantee labour supply 
are reduced.  Firms  can exploit  the  secondary sector by  systematic 
sub-contracting or by  interregional or even  international relocation of 
production.  Moreover  the existence of a  low  paid readily exploitable 
sector provides  the basis for successful competition by  small  firms  (or 
both a  national and  international basis)  which  undermines  the 
primary sector.  This process is enhanced  in periods of prolonged 
recession and  growing uncertainty when  the fixed  costs of large scale 
organisation and  associated employment  systems are becoming  increasingly 
risky.  As  a  result the  1970's have  seen  a  growing  casualisation of  the 
labour  force  throughout  the  advanced  industrial economies despite  the 
growth  in the previous  two  decades of  legal and  organisational support 
for  job protection  (Wilkinson  1981).  The  changing industrial and  labour 
market  structure resulting at least partly from  the  growing crisis in 
advanced  industrial capitalist economies  provides  the background  for  the 
discussion of more  direct ways  of increasing labour flexibility. - 21  -
Sources of increased flexibility in the use of labour. 
New  technology. 
Technological change within establishments may  provide the 
opportunity for redefining job content or for restructuring tasks  to be 
performed.  Although this may  amount  on  occasion to deskilling work  or 
to increasing the division of labour,  much  of the gain  (to employers) 
comes  from  the opportunity to alter the  terms  and  conditions of 
employment  and  increase control.  A redefinition of job  content may 
require an increase in skills to perform the task or raise the 
productivity of the  job but  the  renegotiation of rates of pay  and bonus 
may  permit  the employer  to settle at pay  levels which,  although higher 
than previously,  may  provide lower  labour costs per unit of output. 
Restructuring tasks  can similarly lower overall unit labour costs and 
may  also regroup  employees under different bonus/incentive  schemes.  One 
example  ~f such a  change is the division between  the check-out  function 
and  customers service effected in retailing.  The  job of a  retail 
assistant is effectively deskilled but with modern  technology,  the 
check-out machines  may  perform many  increas2d functions  through the 
transfer of information,  such as stock control and  financial control. 
The  job of  a  check-out assistant,  though possibly deskilled,  may 
actually contain much  greater responsibility for  the handling and 
transfer of information. 
Information technology is an  increasingly important  factor in 
altering the structure of tasks  and  changing  the relation between 
operatives and machines.  Electronic transfer of information can 
increase the part of the production process which is routinised,  for 
example  through robotic operations,  and  the ability of instructed - 22  -
machines  to  produce perfect copies to precise specifications increases 
quality control for many  operations.  A consequence  of this type of 
technology is that it tends  to polarise workforces  into design  and 
technical groups,  concerned with setting up  and initiating production, 
and  those  concerned with assembly,  packaging and  despatch.  The  latter 
jobs may  be highly routinised and  require  low skill levels,  thus 
allowing  easy transfer of labour between  tasks,  and  the  former  group 
mostly  comprises  individuals with general qualifications and  training 
who  are therefore capable of dealing with  task variations and whose  jobs 
are  surrounded by  an  ethos which expects  them  to do  so.  The  consequence 
of  such  a  polarisation of tasks is a  much  increased flexibility of the 
employed  labour force,  once  the  technology has been  introduced. 
However,  technology  can  introduce its own  inflexibility if tasks are not 
completely deskilled and  if successful operation of the new  methods  is 
dependent  on  the very high skills of  a  small group of workers. 
Information  technology  is also capable of relocating control and 
responsibility.  Within an  establishment,  efficient collection of 
information provides data on  quality and  rate of  throughout which  can be 
used  to provide  a  more  efficient use  of available labour:  job  times  are 
better measured  and  the  sequence of operations  can be more  easily 
manipulated  to allow full utilisation of  labour and  reduce waiting time. 
Between  establishments,  information transfer can allow some  relocation 
and  centralisation of  the supervisory function as well as the management 
function.  Such  methods  are usually capital intensive and  raise the 
minimum  efficient scale of production requiring  some  sacrifice of  the 
flexibility benefits of smaller scale operation. - 23  -
a)  organisation: 
A more  rapid and  accurate transfer of information can  improve 
decision making  on  the benefits of centralising or decentralising 
production.  The  improved  co-ordination of activities afforded may,  for 
example,  allow a  production process which  can be easily divided  to be 
dispersed  to different  locations to utilise different  sources of  labour 
or to maintain the volume  of work at different establishments. 
Allocation of work,  particularly between establishments,  may  be an 
important way  in which enterprises  improve their use of  labour and 
increase the degree of control over their workforce.  Some 
establishments,  as  some  machines,  may  only be effectively utilised for 
peak production levels.  If these establishments are located in areas 
with a  captive labour force  (for example,  where  the establishment is a 
major  employer or requires firm-specific skills),  employment  levels may 
be varied in line with production,  so that a  particular establishment 
bears  the brunt of variation in production levels for  the enterprise as 
a  whole.  Such  a  method  of organisation is becoming  increasingly  common 
among  multi-national companies who  site plants in low  cost countries and 
create jobs which may  be more  cyclically vulnerable than jobs in 
indigenous  firms.  Alternatively a  firm  can shift production,  or 
threaten to shift production to overcome  restrictions imposed by  trade 
union organisation. 
Reallocation of work within establishments is not  accomplished  so 
readily.  It frequently  depends  on  establishing multi-task job 
definitions  so that individuals can be easily  t~ansferred between  jobs, 
and needs  to be  supported by  a  suitable payment  system.  Multi-task jobs 
do  not however  have  to be  filled by  experienced highly skilled older - 24  -
employees.  An  internal training scheme  based  on  job rotation is capable 
of providing the necessary workforce,  although there  then needs  to be 
some  effective constraint on  the  turnover of  the labour force. 
At  the opposite end of the scale, highly  fragmented  production 
processes where  the  tasks are easily defined  and  quite separate  can be 
divided between establishments and/or groups  of workers.  Construction 
is probably the best example where  the  tasks are well-defined but 
necessary only for a  part of the production activity {e.g.  bricklaying) 
and  the whole activity is at a  fixed site for a  relatively long period 
of time.  It is then  far easier to sub-contract various parts of the 
production activity to gangs who  are employed  on  a  number  of different 
sites by  a  number  of different contractors over a  period of time.  The 
system of subcontract  labour therefore shifts the costs of inactivity 
from  the contractor to the  employee but,  to be effective, it is 
necessary that subcontract labour be  readily available either because 
the whole  industry is organised in this way  or because  there is a 
captive labour force available.  Many  other forms  of subcontracting are 
to be  found  in the early stages of production,  for example  design  shops 
or manufacturing  components,  or at the  end  of the process,  usually in 
assembly or packaging.  The  early stages are generally subcontracted to 
other firms whilst  the latter stages are more  likely to be put out  to 
particular labour groups,  such as  immigrants or married women  who  may  be 
organised into gangs or subcontract individually. 
There are however  limitations to subcontracting other than  the 
availability of suitable firms  or groups of individuals.  Components  may 
need  to be produced  to detailed specification or high precision in which 
quality control may  force  in-house manufacture.  Assembly work  depends - 25  -
on  the ability to separate the task,  especially given  the  spread of 
automated methods,  on the suitability of the  task to  a  piece rate system 
of pay,  and  on  the ease of transporting parts and finished products. 
Much  of the assembly work subcontracted will be to homeworkers.  But  a 
number  of industries,  for example  cutlery,  provide examples of  inwork by 
groups  on  piece rate and of outwork organised at independent 
establishments  ('the little masters')  where  individuals do  not have 
contracts of employment  but are provided with a  place of work  (usually 
for locating the employees  own  machine)  and  a  gang  leader who 
subcontracts for  the work.  The  piece rate system of pay  is however  a 
fundamental  component  of this organisation of production since it 
relates costs to activity levels and  increases the employee's  share of 
the risks of unstable demand. 
However  the possibilities for sub-contract are not  confined  to 
industries where  the  stages in the production process are not closely 
integrated and  to putting out work  to separate establishments.  Even  in 
oil refining and  steel production many  ancilliary operations and 
services can be  readily separated  from  the main  processes without  loss 
of oper8ting efficiency.  Obvious  examples  are maintenance,  road and 
other forms  of transport and  the provision of services such as catering, 
clerical,  financial and  legal.  It is usual for  a  firm to employ 
independent  firms  of accountants and  lawyers for,  apart  from  legal and 
tax requirements,  the  firms  demand  for  those services are discontinuous 
and it is therefore efficient to buy  the services in discrete amounts. 
The  possibility for subcontracting to obtain specialised services also 
extends  to  such  technical skills as design,  draughtsmenship  and  to 
manual skills such as  tool making.  The  firm obtains many  advantages - 26  -
from  separating specialised workers  from its main  labour force.  The 
supply  can be more  closely adjusted to demand  and  so  the firm avoids 
paying specialised workers  their skilled rates when  employed  on  less 
skilled tasks.  The  skills of  a  directly employed  labour force become 
more  homogeneous  and  therefore more  flexible and  possibly,  easier to 
control.  Moreover  the possibility of sub-contracting provides  the basis 
for  increased control of  the directly employed  labour force.  For 
example,  the British Steel Corporation secured a  significant degree of 
increased productivity from  its engineering and electrical maintenance 
departments  by  insisting they  compete with outside contractors for both 
regular and  emergency maintenance.  The  use of contracting provides  the 
firm with methods  of breaking the link between the rates of  pay  and 
conditions of ancilliary services and  the main  labour force.  An 
important  example  is the employment  of outside contractors for catering, 
cleaning and  routine clerical tasks  (typing).  Such  tasks have usually 
little connection to those of  the main  labour force  and  are usually 
secondary  forms  of employment.  By  separating them  from  the primary 
sector it is possible to significantly reduce  costs and  increase 
flexibility even  in the most  highly organised firms. 
d.  Pay 
A firm  can adjust its labour cost directly by changing  the level of 
pay;  ideally in line with output  and  price.  This  raises two  major 
issues,  the  system of wage  payment  and  the methods  of its adjustment. 
The  question is made  more  complicated,  however,  by  the fact  that labour 
services are not purchased directly;  the  firms  needs  to extract  these 
from  the worker it employs.  The  securing of a  wage  effort bargain can - 27  -
be facilitated by  linking pay directly to output but this raises 
problems when  it is difficult to measure output or wh~8 output varies 
independently of worker effort  (e.g.  with changed  tec~~ogy). Therefore 
time rates may  be preferred although this raises probleps of different 
interpretation by  employers  and workers  of the  terms  t>f(::~the  bargain. 
The  employers main  concern is with the average untt labour costs so 
that whilst he may  have  to negotiate with subsets of bds  labour force at 
different times he has  the possibility of  changing  av~ages (either of 
pay or productivity)  by altering the composition of  ~~§]·Workforce or the 
technology  employed.  On  the other hand,  employees wiJJ..:Il>e  aware  of  the 
possibility and will see maintaining internal wage  d~f{?rentials as 
important  and will seek negotiated rather than  impos~}.modification of 
technology  and  work organisation.  The  labour force w.ii1l  see control of 
output as an  important part of wage  bargaining  fearin.glft.for  example, 
cuts in piece rates if output  increases.  They  will a-1§§  be  concerned  to 
maintain stable earnings and will want  fall back rate$arsuaranteed 
working weeks  and  other forms  of  income  security.  MQJe§ver  workers will 
not be directly concerned with the relationship  betwe~~heir earnings 
and  the price of products which  they product:  they  arep~pre concerned 
with the movement  in the price of wage  goods.  Insofa~ ~s the  two  sets 
of prices move  differently,  the aims  of each party to  ~~gotiations will 
not necessarily be compatible. 
Traditional forms  of wage  determination which  pe~t  wage 
flexibility include the individual bargain  (paying eacteemployee 
according  to his merit or paying him as little as  poss~@~e), paying by 
the  piece  (directly relating earnings to output)  withe~ any  guaranteed 
earnings,  or subcontracting.  Piece rate systems are  n~tappropriate for - 28  -
many  forms  of production,  particularly where  the process  cannot be 
fragmented  into well defined tasks or the contribution to output or cost 
valued,  and  hence  time rated work has  always existed in certain 
industries for specific jobs.  Piecework also has  the disadvantage to 
the employers of linking wages  to increases in output resulting from 
technical progress and  learning by doing.  Therefore  the ability to 
easily change  the rate will be an  important consideration in the choice 
of payments  systems  and  this will depend at least partly on  the 
strength of workers  and union control - itself a  function of the level 
of activity.  The  degree of flexibility of unit labour costs offered by 
piece work will therefore vary inversely with the degree of workers 
organisation and directly with the level of unemployment.  An  important 
aspect of  the choice of  time or piece-rated work will also be  the 
disincentive effect of each method,  either on  the  throughput of  time 
rated work or on  the quality of piece rated work. 
The  emergence  of collective bargaining brought with it limitations 
on  the possibility of striking individual bargains,  guaranteed weekly 
earnings and  a  more  specific relationship between  time rated work  and 
movements  in retail prices.  The  resulting structure of guarantees and 
minimum  rates did not mean  that earnings moved  with retail prices,  only 
that  there was  more  force  for  them  to do  so.  Employers  have  retained an 
element of wage  determination,  admittedly bounded below,  which continues 
to allow some  flexibility in pay levels.  Common  enough  in the late 19th 
century was  the practice of relating wages  to product price by sliding 
scales:  however,  the variability of rates of  pay~ whether fixed  through 
time or piece rates,  which  resulted  from  product price changes  of highly 
competitive products  (such as coal and  steel)  relative to the price of - 29  -
food  had been a  major feature  in bringing about  a  system of collective 
bargaining and  minimum  rates to restrict the full impact of  the sliding 
scales.  Technical  change which broke  the link between individual effort 
and  output and  increasing union control reduced  the attractiveness of 
piece rates to employers.  More  recent  forms,  including different 
payment-by-results  schemes  and bonuses,  were  framed  as incentive schemes 
but,  over a  range of pay,  had  the effect of introducing fluctuations 
into earnings in line with prices and  shifting some  of  the cost of low 
levels of activity onto the employees.  Flexibility is also secured 
through productivity bargaining by which workers sell control exercised 
through working practices for higher wages. 
The  attractiveness of various systems of wage  determination moves 
cyclically and  in different directions for employers  and  employees. 
Methods  of wage  payments  linking output to wages  are more  attractive to 
workers when  output in increasing rapidly and  when  high employment 
strengthens their bargaining position;  in such  times  income  security 
will be of less importance because alternative employment  opportunities 
will be plentiful.  By  contrast firms might be expected to move  away 
from  payment  by result to control wage  drift and  to offer more  income 
and  job security to reduce  labour turnover.  In a  recession workers will 
look to the greater ·security of time  rates whilst firms will attempt  to 
link wages  to output by reintroducing payment  by result, by productivity 
bargaining and  by  attempting to negotiate fall back rates and guarantees 
of earnings and  hours of work.  However  certain forms  of wage  payment 
systems may  be difficult to renegotiate although they fix pay 
independently of output.  Merit  payments  are based on  the quality and 
reliability of the worker and are not usually variables with respect  to - 30  -
output.  Age  related incremented scales may  also introduce inflexibility 
- and  even unplanned wage  increases - as recruitment  slows with 
recession and as  consequently the average age of  the workforce 
increases.  Merit payments  and  increment  scales are frequently 
introduced in booms  as  a  means  of retaining labour.  In this respect 
they lose their relevance in recession particularly if the downturn is 
prolonged. 
The  conflict between  employer and  employee  interests in the wage 
determination process is therefore crucial to understanding the role of 
pay  in the flexible use of  labour;  In periods of boom,  the employer may 
be willing to compromise,  allowing labour a  larger share of his 
additional profits, which meets  employees minimum  claims but in 
recession his survival may  depend  on his ability to achieve a  cut in the 
average  level of pay relative to product prices or  productivity. 
However,  in recession,  a  position of  compromise  for labour is less easy 
to establish since they would  frequently be asked  to take a  cut in real 
pay relative to recent levels rather than reduce their share of 
additional real income.  At  the  level of  the establishment  (although not 
for  the  economy  as  a  whole),  the issue might  be put as a  trade-off 
between pay  and  the  level of employment. 
In large and/or well organised industries,  the content of 
collective agreements  and  legislation has only a  limited impact  in 
reducing  the available flexibility in pay  levels:  of much  more 
importance  is the workplace organisation,  and its custom and practice, 
as an  opposition to employers.  There are agreed  procedures  for dispute, 
conciliation and arbitration and  the machinery and  resources for strike 
action or lockouts which  limit the range of opti6ns open  to an  employee - 31  -
to achieve flexibility but also which provides him with a  means  of 
effecting a  compromise.  In smaller firms,  the content of collective 
agreements  and  legislation,  setting minimum  rates and  conditions, 
impinge more  directly on  the feasible  range of pay but  the absence of 
disputes procedures and  less likelihood of strikes allow the employer  to 
use  a  wider  range of methods  of achieving flexibility in average pay.. 
e)  employment  practices: 
One  course of action is to minimise  the  coverage of collective 
agreements by employing  labour not  covered by agreements.  This, 
together with seeking a  structure of employment  which minimises  average 
levels of  pay,  very much  depends  on  the availability of an appropriate 
source of labour.  Because of the restrictions and  costs of hiring and 
firing labour,  strategies by  employers are likely to be  longer  term,  not 
for  example  to be used  only to meet  cyclically low  demand. 
Recruitment  of operatives for most  jobs in small firms is possible 
and costs may  be quite low,  advertising taking place mainly by word  of 
mouth  in the local community.  Firing labour may  also be relatively 
cheap but is more  damaging  to the  image  of  the  firm as an  employer  in 
the workplace and  in a  small  community.  In larger organised firms, 
however,  recruitment is more  limited in that only a  restricted range  of 
jobs are agreed to be filled from  outside:  firing is also more  difficult 
to achieve selectively since there are agreements  on  the shopfloor as  to 
the incidence of  redundancy  (for example,  last in first out rules). 
Taken  together with  the additional costs and  resistance  imposed by 
organised labour,  the level of employment  tends  to be  less variable. 
Training is however  a  source of potential flexibility in the use of 
labour in all firms.  In combination with agreements  (official or - 32  -
unofficial)  over promotion  (that is, by open  or closed chains),  specific 
training can be used either to limit the internal mobility of employees, 
thus dividing  the workforce  into separate groups,  or through  job 
rotation and  experience to increase their internal mobility. 
Productive  labour input is in principle variable since the number 
of hours worked  by  each employee  is variable.  However  the existence of 
guaranteed weeks,  guaranteed weekly earnings and  payment  for waiting 
times,  together with other overhead costs such as social security 
contributions by  employers,  means  that each  employee has a  minimum  cost 
per week  irrespective of hours worked.  Whilst it may  be possible  to 
find  employees  for whom  these costs are avoidable,  they may  not be 
regarded as suitable or acceptable for  employment.  Then  employers  may 
have  recourse  to flexibility in hours worked  among  the  labour force 
subject to the minimum  cost constraint.  Thus,  it is common  to find 
short-time working  (defined here as working  less than  normal hours), 
overtime as an option to increased employment  levels despite the  premium 
rates,  employment  of part-time labour,  an  increase in shift work  or a 
reorganisation of shift work  to exclude shifts bearing premium  rates of 
pay. 
Short-time working is (within a  large firm organisation)  not  a  long 
term option:  it raises the average unit labour cost  and  does  nothing  to 
reduce  the costs of firing the  labour.  Overtime,  however,  is a  long 
term option.  Despite raising the unit labour costs, it can be offset 
against  the current overhead  costs of an additional employee  and  is 
payment  to an  experienced employee,  thus avoiding the costs of  training 
of new  recruits.  Furthermore,  it is an element  of flexibility in the 
working  day which  allows delivery dates  to be met  and  daily work - 33  -
schedules  to be kept,  especially where  the output of one  group  feeds 
directly into the workload of another group,  hence avoiding waiting  time 
during  the normal working  day.  For similar reasons, it is useful for 
maintenance and  repair of machinery  and  for  tooling machines  and  setting 
up  production runs.  Part-time working is attractive because it normally 
involves unorganised  labour and,  being outside the  scope of collective 
agreements,  is paid at lower hourly rates.  It allows divisibility of 
labour  input  (for example,  where  the workload per day  is low or to add  a 
twilight shift)  and is particularly useful for  some  ancilliary 
activities such as  canteen work  or cleaning,  where  these are not 
contracted out  and  for retailing to meet  seasonal,  lunchtime and weekend 
peaks.  There is however  a  certain amount  of legislation,  such as over 
minimum  pay rates or maternity leave, which may  be restrictive.  However 
some  labour legislation does  not apply  to part-time workers.  Finally, 
shift working may  be  technically based or cost based.  Many  continuous 
plants operate with equipment which must  remain  in permanent operation: 
not  only are the costs of halting work prohibitive but  frequently  the 
equipment is damaged.  For other equipment,  there is no  technical need 
but,  given acquiesence by  the employed  labour force  (for current or 
traditional reasons),  the machines  can be efficiently run at a  high 
level of utilisation and  the use of shift times  can when  manipulated 
significantly reduce waiting time. 
The  important  features of all of  these sources of flexibility are 
that their usefulness  to different firms  depends  on  the product  and 
technology  employed,  that  they  sometimes  require avoidance of collective 
agreements,  that  they  tend  to  impose  the costs of adjustment  on  labour 
rather than capital,  that this falls disproportionately on  a  captive - 34  -
supply of  labour or unorganised  segment  of the  labour force,  and  that 
workplace  organisation is not  solely dependent  on  social organisations 
so that economic  interests can be used  to reduce  resistance to  change. 
In  the next section we  briefly reiterate some  of the aspects of 
flexibility insofar as  they can be achieved by establishments, 
enterprises and  the  industry as a  whole. 
5.  Flexibility at different levels in an  industry 
a)  at the establishment level: 
Within  an  establishment,  flexibility in the use of labour is 
desired to achieve  flexibility in labour costs per unit of output  to 
maintain or improve  competitiveness  in product markets.  Certain product 
markets  require flexible methods  of production to cope with frequent 
changes  in product  design  (or market  advantage  can be  gained by  having 
this flexibility)  or to meet  considerable variation in the level of 
demand.  The  methods;by which  labour costs can be varied per unit of 
output  to meet  these needs  are however not  simply  concerned with 
changing a  single rate of pay or the level of employment  of  a 
homogeneous  workforce or supply of  labour.  Unit  labour costs in an 
establishment  can be varied by  changing  the wage  bill in relation to 
output by altering average  earnings or the level of employment  or the 
level of production.  But,  because  individuals and  jobs differ,  there is 
a  range of  individual or job-specific unit  labour costs  so that the 
composition of  the workforce is an  important  consideration. 
Furthermore,  different individuals can be  employed at different rates of 
pay  on  jobs which  have different productivities but with individual 
productivity varying less than the productivity of different  tasks: - 35  -
firms  therefore may  also  choose how  they match  individuals  and  jobs. 
Thus  the  forms  of  technology  available  (which  change  the productivity 
of jobs)  and  the  forms  of organisation of production available  (easing 
the setting up  of production runs)  can both be permissive factors  in 
improving  firms ability to compete. 
Flexibility in the use of  labour may  be  facilitated by  these 
technical and organisational factors but their existence does not 
guarantee flexibility.  Other conditions required may  include the 
ability of  the workforce  to satisfy changing job definitions,  perhaps 
for  individuals to have multi-task jobs or for pay  (either through rates 
or a  PBR  type  scheme)  to be  frequently adjusted or for there to be  low 
barriers to hiring and firing  labour at will.  It is likely therefore 
that, where  technical and  organisational factors facilitating a  flexible 
use of  labour are absent,  there needs  to be  limited or circumscribed 
application of voluntary collective agreements  and/or a  supply of  labour 
who  can be  employed  on  terms  and conditions of  employment  less 
favourable  than the main  labour forces.  Even  when  technical and 
organisational factors are present,  their usefulness may  well depend  on 
the existence of vulnerable groups  in the  labour force. 
b)  at the enterprise level: 
Enterprises have potential methods  of flexible organisation over 
and  above  those  open  to individual establishments.  Work  can be 
transferred between similar establishments,  for  example  away  from  those 
establishments where  the workforce  can be  rundown  by natural wastage  or 
more  cheaply made  redundant  :  there  can be more  cross-subsidisation of 
activities through a  wider  range  and diversity both of products  and - 36  -
final buyers:  the location of control over  the organisation of 
production can be  removed  from  the workplace if desired:  horizontal and 
vertical integration can be  achiev~d for  the enterprise but not  for 
individual establishments if it is desirable to keep different 
activities separate without  losing control of quality and  delivery:  the 
workforce is not  spatially concentrated and  drawn  from  the  same 
community  so  that  there can be  some  dilution of collective response.  By 
divorcing management  responsibility from  the actual workplace, 
enterprises can more  easily make  use of opportunities for  the flexible 
use of  labour in particular establishments. 
c)  at the industry level: 
Comparable  to  the variations in employment  level in establishments, 
employment  levels in an  industry can also be varied by  the births and 
deaths  of firms.  However,  empirical evidence  shows  that,  although 
births of  firms  (particularly small firms)  do  account  for  the bulk of 
gross  job  creation,  the bulk of net  job  creation is accounted  for by 
large establishments because of the high incidence of closure among 
small  firms.  On  the other hand,  it is also apparent  that workforces  in 
many  establishments are actually remarkably  stable.  However,  births and 
deaths  of establishments may  have  a  more  important role than varying the 
overall employment  level in that they provide additional specific 
productive capacity required in an  industry over relatively short 
periods.  These additional elements of productive capacity will be 
needed  to meet  subcontracts offered by  established firms:  firms  may 
subcontract for production to meet  peak demand,  thereby  retaining the 
link with  the  customer without  increasing their productive capacity: - 37  -
manufacture of  components  may  be subcontracted,  particularly where  there 
are no benefits of  scale or integration,  so  that turnover  in component 
suppliers might be high:  and  the production process may  be  such that 
certain activities can be  subcontracted,  particular to individuals or 
groups,  who  therefore bear the costs of inactivity or low utilisation 
themselves.  The  primary  function of subcontracting is therefore to 
transfer from  an  establishment or enterprise the responsibility for 
varying productive capacity and  to let this,  and its attendant costs 
fall directly on  the  immediate producers. 
This is not  to say that all small firms  are vulnerable,  bearing the 
risks of a  large firm,  operating with small profit margins  and volatile 
demand,  and being  forced  to employ  labour on  poor  terms  and  conditions. 
Many  small firms  exist in their own  right as producers of quality goods, 
low volume  orders and  specialist products:  their labour forces may  be as 
well paid and  as well protected as  those in large firms.  Even  contract 
labour may  be satisfied with the working  arrangements,  although with the 
exception of  industry wide  organisation of contracting groups  (as  in 
Construction)  rates of pay  do  not  compare  favourably with those for 
contractual employment.  But  these small firms  are not  the  ones which 
tend  to come  and  go  and which are exposed  to volatile demand.  Exposed 
firms,  who  must  depend  on  cheap  and  flexible  sources of labour,  do  not 
necessarily face  the final buyers  in each market but are at the mercy  of 
other firms  in the  same  industry. 
There is of course a  third group of  small and  medium  sized firms  in 
an  industry,  those  seeking to break into existing markets or attempting 
to establish new  products.  These  firms  do  account  for quite a  high 
proportion of births and deaths in a  number  of industries,  predominantly - 38  -
those where major product  innovation ia takins place, but these firms 
tend to develop  into quality or specialist producers or grow  into  (or 
merge with)  large enterprises if they are not  force  to close. 
d)  Collective behaviour: 
In economic  terms,  flexibility in the use of labour is generally 
associated with lower earnings, at least for  some  groups,  or with more 
unstable employment  and  hence  a  greater incidence and  duration of 
unemployment.  There is in fact considerable stability to be  found  in 
employment  in larger firms but  the security of employment  of some 
workers  may  depend  either on  the employment  of vulnerable aroups  in the 
same  establishment  and  through outwork or a  sub-atr•t• of firms which 
are Slgnificantly more  exposed  to the forces of ca.petition. 
Collective organisation is an  important  factor in protecting pay 
and  employment  conditions and  evidently has  an i_,ortant role to play in 
limiting the conditions for and  instruments of flexibility in the use of 
labour.  In the workplace, _it  provides an opportunity to restrict the 
frequency  of renegotiation and  perpetuates  custom and practice and,  at 
the industry or national level,  provides a  floor  through minimum  and 
guaranteed  terms  and  conditions.  However  the conflict of interest 
between capital and  labour does  create a  number  of occasions  on  which 
collective organisation can be weakened  by  playina on  the interests of 
different groups within the labour force  and  reducing resistance to 
change. 
Legislation on  employment  and  for dependent populations provides 
only  limited protection against  the working of the market.  Management 
frequently object  to legal rules and  regard  them as a  restriction on - 39  -
their prerogative and hence  consider protection best achieved  through 
voluntary collective agreements.  For  those not  in employment,  and  those 
not protected in employment,  legislation is intended to provide minimum 
safeguards to standards of living.  But it is then  regarded as social 
policy,  distinct  from  economic  conditions and necessary to offset  some 
of  the anti-social effects of competition.  As  such, it can be 
undermined by  a  belief that social transformation is required or that 
behaviour will only change if the full economic  effects are borne by 
individuals who  are not  compensated by social legislation. 
Methods  for achieving flexibility in the use of  labour have been 
restricted by  collective responses,  both voluntary in the workplace  and 
on  broader social fronts.  But  neither forms  of limitation is 
independent of  economic  let alone social conditions and  hence  may  change 
under pressure  from  capital demanding  more  opportunities to preserve 
profitability at the expense of labour. - 40-
Conclusions 
As  labour costs become  increasingly fixed,  employment  decisions are 
influenced by factors similar to those determining  investment decisions. 
The  inability of firms  to shed  labour and its associated costs lengthens 
the  time period relevant to the employment  decision.  If the fixity of 
employment  costs increases or if economic uncertainty grows,  firms 
will be  expected to be less willing to increase employment(!)  or will 
look for alternative forms  of labour organisation. 
An  increase in the fixing of wage  costs or uncertainty will shift 
the balance of  comparative advantage away  from  technical and 
administrative forms  of industrial organisation which are complex 
towards more  simpler forms,  and might bias technical progress by 
favouring  certai~ forms  of innovation.  In this respect it is to be 
expected that growing fixity of labour costs or growing uncertainty or 
both,  would  tend  to offset the benefits of  improved organisation and 
technology and  to favour  small at the expense of large firms.  On  the 
other hand,  growing  fixity of  labour costs associated with individual 
job security - redundancy rules, unfair dismissal legislation, maternity 
leave etc - raises more  difficulties for a  firm with few  workers  than 
one with many  who  could therefore spread the risk more  thinly.  An 
important  reason for the growth in labour only subcontracting in 
construction and  elsewhere is the shifting of responsibility for social 
provision to the employee  and  the avoidance of health and  safety 
regulation. 
(1)  and,  indeed,  to invest because  the relevant capital cost of an 
investment project is the cost of building and  equipment  plus any 
fixed  labour cost. - 41  -
Institutional arrangements  and legislation affecting the fixity of 
labour and  its costs can also be expected to have  important effects on 
the  level and  structure of employment  particularly in periods of 
economic  crisis.  Firms might be expected  to casualise the  labour force 
either by  employing more  temporary workers - women  (part-time and 
full-time),  immigrants etc- or by subcontracting.  A longer  term effect 
might be  the shift of industry to areas away  from  the centres of trade 
union organisation and  a  restructuring of industry in favour of small 
firms where  union and statutory rules are more  difficult to enforce. 
The  consequent  competitive pressure on  the organised sector could result 
in its further shrinkage. 
Thus  the long  term effect of the  introduction of  improved working 
conditions and  job security based on  the individual firm could be a 
reduction in such protection particularly in periods when  that 
protection was  most  needed,  an  increasing problem of policing union and 
statutory rules,  and higher levels of unemployment.  Many  economists 
welcome  this development  seeing it as evidence of an increase in the 
competitiveness of the  labour market  and hence its allocative 
efficiency.  However  where  the underlying assumptions of neo-classical 
theory do  not hold - that the system tends  to full employment  and that 
competition in the labour market is atomistic - the decline in living 
standards and  the deepening of divisions between  labour and  capital and 
between different  segments of the  labour market will have disruptive 
social and political consequences  in addition to the  enormous  waste of 
increasingly high levels of unemployment. 
On  the other hand, it is impossible to deny  that the ability of a 
firm to adjust rapidly to  changed  economic  circumstances and,  in more - 42  -43· 
general terms,  the efficient use of labour requires increased 
flexibility in adjusting labour to the level of output.  Establishment 
and  enterprise specific forms  of job protection and  systems of social 
security and welfare provision by  increasing the fixed cost of 
employment  have  the effect of increasing the fixity of labour 
independently of any  technical or organisational factor which  can be 
explained in terms of efficiency.  Moreover  such  forms  of job protection 
and  social security provision are counter productive.  Trade union and 
other rules based on  limiting entry to the place of work  reinforce the 
division within the labour market  increasing the degree of disadvantage 
in the  secondary sector.  However  the existence of large secondary 
sectors provides the basis for alternative forms  of industrial 
organisation which undermine  the effectiveness of job control in the 
primary sector.  The  existence of trade union  imposed  job controls and 
high employment  related social security levies provides additional 
inducements for firms  to relocate in the secondary sector.  Growing 
crisis and  increasing uncertainty increase the incentive to firms  to 
externalise their risk which  further weakens  the primary sector and 
increases  the uncertainty of employment.  Thus  a  sort of Gresham  law 
operates in which bad  employment  conditions drive out the good. 
This discussion suggests  two  major areas for further discussion and 
research which whilst separate are necessarily complementary.  More 
information is needed  on  systems of work  organisation and  the 
relationship between work  organisation and  the flexibility of response 
by  firms  and  industries to changing  the technical and  market 
environment.  Such  an investigation necessarily raises the related 
question of  job security and  income  maintenance  and  how  schemes  for 
improving  both,and  hence  removing  much  of the  resistance to change  can  be 
organised and  financed. - 44  -
Income  Maintenance 
Economic  recession has inevitably resulted in a  reduction in income 
levels for a  sianificant proportion of  the population.  This paper 
examines  the  impact  of reductions in income  and critically examines 
orthodox economic  theories that advocate  such  reductions as a  necessary 
adjustment  to the current economic  conditions.  An  alternative analysis 
is presented in which  low  levels of  income  are  cons~dered to result from 
the disadvantaaed position of certain groups  in the labour market  rather 
than their econoalc wotth.  In our view a  reduction in income  in such 
circumstances miaht have a  damaging  effect on  employment  and  the social 
and political stability of  the system. 
Trends  in  low  incomes 
In Britain and  other advanced  countries the  1960s  and  early 1970's 
saw  an  improvement  in the absolute and  relative level of  low ·incomes. 
During this period the -.le/female,  adult/youth and  low  paid/high paid 
adult wage  differentials generally narrowed.  This  trend in growing 
equality in earned  income  was  accompanied by  a  more  diligent effort to 
ensure that the recipients of social welfare did not fall behind in the 
general upward  movement  in living standard.  Changes  in tax and benefits 
introduced earnings linked sickness,  unemployment  and  retirement 
benefits and governments  committed  themselves  to index-linking social 
welfare benefits to ptevent  the erosion of their real value by 
inflation. 
The  fiscal effect of this income  redistribution was  a  growth of  the 
real tax rate and  an extension of  the  tax net to  include  lower and  lower 
levels of  income.  In countries with a  fast rate of income  growth  and  in - 45  -
periods of rapid economic  advance  governments  could  increase the  share 
of transfers in national  income  relatively easily.  In Britain with slow 
growth  and more  widely as  the rate of  increase in national income  slowed 
down  in the 1970's,  fiscal drag met  growing  resistance with inflationary 
consequences. 
In  the  second half of  the  1970's as economic  crisis deepened with 
rising levels of unemployment,  accelerating inflation and  an  increasing 
threat of a  return of mass  poverty to Western  Europe  the broad  consensus 
in favour of an egalitarian policy of  incomes distribution has broken 
down.  Economists are increasingly arguing that Government  attempts  to 
maintain full employment  are counter productive.  Moreover  the  consensus 
amongst  economists is swinging  towards policies designed  to cut social 
welfare provision,  reduce real wages  and  remove  minimum  wages  control in 
the interests of raising the  level of employment  and  generating economic 
growth.  What  is being proposed is a  less equal distribution of  income  in 
the interest of economic  progress.  On  this view,  in the  short  run at 
least,  the maintenance of  individual  incomes  may  be  detrimental to the 
maintenance of aggregate  income.  This  argument  is in flat opposition to 
the general opinion held recently by  economists  and  policy makers  that 
high  growth,  egalitarian income  distribution and  humane  social 
provisions were  essentially complements. 
The  new  orthodoxy 
The  new  orthodoxy has  returned  to a  pre-Keynesian analysis in 
several important  respects.  This view holds  that the level of 
employment  is determined  in the  labour market  and  that unemployment  is 
essentially frictional or voluntary.  The  implicit reassertion of Say's 
Law  and  the explicit reassertion of the quantity theory of money  carries - 46  -
with it the implication that government  expenditure  crowds  out public 
expenditure and,  moreover,  deficit financing  increases the money  supply 
and  hence is inflationary.  Following directly from this is the view 
that redistributive government  policies by  raising taxes  reduce both 
saving,  and  hence  investment,  and  the  incentive to work,  and  hence 
productive effort.  In addition it is argued,  the provision of 
unemployment  benefits and  other forms  of  income  support raises the 
supply price of  labour  (and  hence voluntary unemployment)  and  increases 
the length of the job  search  (and hence frictional unemployment).  The 
conclusions of this line of reasoning is that redistributive policies 
reduce  income,  not least of all for  those with low  incomes.  Policies 
which  reduce  taxation will have  the opposite effect. 
Redistribution to the rich will raise savings  and  investment,  a 
reduction of tax on  earned  income will increase incentive and  the 
lowering of  the social wage  will encourage  employment  and  thereby  reduce 
"non-productive"  consumption.  The  overall effect of a  reduction  in 
income  redistribution by  the government,  the new  supply siders argue, 
will, by increasing the inequality of  income  distribution,  increase its 
absolute level at each point in the distribution.  Moreover  the 
additional taxable  income  so generated which will increase government 
revenue. 
There is little real evidence that a  reductiQn in taxation will, or 
has,  had  the effect of raising the level of investment by  increasing 
savings or that a  cut  in tax will directly lead to an  increase in labour 
input.  In this latter respect  the historical trend of a  progressive 
reduction in hours worked  as real  incomes  rise suggests that a  reduction 
in tax could lead to a  reduction rather than an  increase in productive - 47  -
effort.  On  the other hand,  it is to be expected that a  cut  in taxes 
might  increase the level of investment by  increasing post  tax profits. 
However  if the intention is to  induce  investment directly by  increasing 
its attractiveness rather than indirectly and  uncertainly through 
encouraging savings,  then  a  cut  in profit tax and  tax relief.related 
directly to  investment would  be more  effective than  a  cut in the general 
level of taxation. 
But  perhaps  the most  convincing evidence against the simple 
argument  that a  cut in taxation financed by  a  reduction in the social 
wage  will increase national income  and  the  level of employment  is the 
evidence  from  Britain that three years  of experiment of  such policies 
has had  the opposite effect;  GDP  has fallen and  unemployment  has risen 
steeply.  Moreover  the  tax burden has  increased rather than fallen with 
the reduction in the  tax base as earned  incomes  fall and with the growth 
of  social security payments  as  unemployment  rises.  The  explanation for 
the failure of the Thatcher experiment is that any  incentives to  the 
supply side have been  swamped  by  the collapse of effective demand 
resulting from restrictive economic  policies.  This experience reaffirms 
Keynes'  view that the level of  employment  is determined by  the level of 
effective demand  and  that policies operating at the micro-economic level 
to  stimulate economic activity,  for example  by  a  reduction in real wage 
costs, will only be successful if it can be assumed  that the level of 
effective demand  will be unaffected by  the micro-economic  stimulants -
i.e. that Say's Law  operates.  In this respect policies designed at 
redistribute income  from  the poor to the rich are particularly suspect. 
Not  only does  the incentive effect have  to be  large enough  to offset the 
negative impact  on  effective demand  of  the redistribution to  income - 48  -
where  savings are high, (1)  but the  response in terms of increased 
production must  be sufficiently rapid to offset the  immediately 
depressing effect of the cut in consumption. 
The  evidence that supply does  not necessarily create its own  demand 
so  that a  regressive redistribution of  income  could increase rather than 
reduce  employment  provides macro-economic  reasons  for maintaining  income 
levels.  However  this does not dispose of the  argument  that the increase 
in their relative earnings has priced the  low  paid out  of the  labour 
market  and  that existence of social provision increases voluntary 
unemployment.  The  belief that  such measures will improve  the operation 
of  the labour market has encouraged the British government  to  remove  the 
earnings related element  from  unemployment  pay,  to break the link 
between social welfare provision and  the level of retail prices,  to 
re-open  the question of  the detrimental effect on  employment  of minimum 
wages  and  to introduce a  scheme  whereby  the payment  of  a  subsidy for  the 
employment  of  school  leavers requires  firms  to pay youths  no  more  than  a 
certain wage. 
Income  maintenance  and  employment. 
a.  the neo-classic approach 
Neo-classical theory draws  a  clear distinction between worth and 
need.  Worth,  it is argued,  is most  effectively evaluated by  the market 
and  when  it falls below need,  making  up  the difference should be left to 
the benevolence of society. (2)  Thus  Brittan argues: 
(1) 
(2) 
The  incentive would  increase investment  and  exporting to offset the 
reduction in consumption. 
Subject to the proviso that the benevolence is minimal  so as not  to 
act as a  disincentive to work. - 49  -
'This  (that wages  should be determined by market  forces)  does 
not mean  that workers with low  earnings power  should be left to 
fend  for  themselves.  "Topping-up" of wages  by  family  allowances 
or any  form  of negative  income  tax can raise their living 
standards,  as far as  the real generosity of their fellow citizens 
will allow  (as distinct  from  the  sham  generosity of passing  laws 
which  appear  to cost us nothing).  Best  of all would  be help for 
such  people  to acquire aptitudes and  qualifications which will 
raise the market value of their services - admittedly easier said 
than done.'  (Brittan 1975  p.44). 
Flexibility in wage  determination is advocated  to meet  both short and 
long  term objectives.  In  the  long  term,  it is argued,  the market  can be 
depended  upon  to adjust  the wage  structure to reflect efficiency 
differences between workers.  In the short  term wages  may  fall below 
their equilibrium level in some  areas particularly when  the process of 
reallocating labour from  declining to expanding sectors is slow.  In 
this case the  low wages  serve  the purpose of  reducing frictional 
unemployment.  But  in  the  long  term this misallocation of labour will 
disappear as workers  are attracted away  from  firms  unable  to pay  the 
market  rate and as,  consequently,  the wage  structure moves  back into 
equilibrium.  If, in the  long  term,  wages  at the  lower  end  of the 
structure are below what  is socially acceptable then,  the nee-classics 
argue,  this is because  the productivity of  some  workers  is so  low  or 
because  the market  is imperfect.  Any  attempt  to raise low wages  by 
trade union organisation or by  administrative means  will merely  exclude 
from  the  labour market workers with earnings potential below  imposed 
minima. - so  -
Neo-classical theories explain unemployment  when  the  system is in 
equilibrium by  rigidities in the  labour market  and  include minimum  wage 
legislation and  trade union organisation amongst  those rigidities.  In 
this view the reduction of wages would  encourage  the employment  of 
workers with productivity lower  than this minimum.  Brittan takes this 
argument  one  stage further by  arguing that wages  should not only fall to 
the point where  they reflect workers'  productivity but also to  the point 
where  they  compensate  the holders for their prejudices against the 
employment  of disadvantaged workers.  Thus: 
'It does not matter if there are real disadvantages,  or 
prejudices  ex~sting in the minds  of employers  or customers. 
Minimum  wage  laws. or enforced non-discrimination in pay where 
the desire to discriminate remains,  will suppress adverse pay 
differentials at the cost of increasing unemployment  for  the 
disadvantaged  gr~ups'  (Brittan  1975  p.44). 
This  argument  has been  shown  to be weak  even within its neo-classical 
framework.  It was  argued by Becker that racial minorities and  other 
discriminated groups would  need  to accept wages  lower  than their 
marginal productivity to compensate  employers  for  the psychological hurt 
resulting from  their prejudices or to provide  the additional resources 
to compensate  the rest of their workforce by  an  increment  above  their 
margin~ product sufficient to overcome  their distaste for working with 
members  of socially excluded groups.  However  such a  system of price 
discrimination could only operate in a  competitive  system under the 
additional and  unlikely condition that all employers are equally 
prejudiced.  Less-prejud~ced employers  can  secure cost advantages  over 
more  prejudiced employers by  employing all or mainly disadvantaged - 51  -
workers at lower wage  rates and would  therefore under competitive market 
conditions ultimately drive the more  prejudiced employers out of 
business  (Arrow  1973)  and at the  same  time  raise the wages  of  the 
disadvantaged workers  through  increased demand  for their labour. 
A more  fundamental  objection to  the views  of Brittan and  other 
neoclassics that a  floor  to wages  inevitably results in a  misallocation 
of  resources is that this argument  rests on  the assumption that the 
economy  is generally competitive.  If, however  competition is normally 
imperfect,  the efficient allocation of resources might acquire more 
rather than less intervention.  Monopoly  in one  sector means  that prices 
there are above  the optimising level and  insufficient resources are 
utilised in the monopolised  sector.  In these circumstances  too many 
resources will be  concentrated in the competitive sector and  prices 
there will be  sub-optional.  The  first - best solution would  be a 
reduction in the degree of market  imperfection to  reduce prices  (and 
expand  employment  prospects)  in the monopolised sectors.  But  this might 
prove  impossible.  The  second best solution would  be  to move  towards  a 
more  optimal structure through an increase in relative factor costs in 
the competitive sector.  Wage  reductions as a  route to full employment 
are in practice arguing for  the opposite policy,  a  decrease in relative 
factor costs in the  competitive sector.  This policy would  serve to 
increase  the degree of monopoly  and  induce  further misalloation !f 
resources.  Neoclassical theorists have usually  chosen to use their 
analytical framework  to argue  the  case against market  intervention in an 
assumed  competitive labour market.  Paradoxically the theoretical 
framework  could be  readily enlisted in support of raising low  pay under 
the different but more  realistic assumptions of imperfect  competition. - 52  -
However  the major objections to the neo-classical arguments  about 
the relationship between wages  and  employment  are not  confined to  the 
selective use  they make  of their own  theory but rather that their theory 
has little useful to say about  the operations of  the  labour market. 
This belief that  the downward  flexibility of wages  will result only in 
short  term "exploitation" of workers  trapped into declining industries 
and  low  profitability firms  and  that in the long  run all workers will be 
paid their worth rests on  the  twin notions that within the constraints 
of natural aptitude and  general training workers with wages  lower  than 
the equilibrium market valuation have  ready access  to alternative jobs 
at higher levels of pay  and  that in the long  run  labour is in short 
supply.  Neither proposition bears close examination. 
The  overwhelming  evidence of empirical studies is that the  labour 
supply is divided into non-competing groups with certain classes of 
labour more  or less permanently confined  to the low  paid sector 
irrespective of their productivity.  At  the fringe of industrial 
activity firms whose  ability to pay  is constrained by  their efficiency, 
product market  position or some  combination of both offer wages 
considerably below  those in the primary industrial sectors.  The 
continued existence of such  firms  (at least at current levels of 
efficiency)  depend  on  their ability to recruit workers whose  relative 
productivity is higher than the relative pay  they are prepared  (or,  more 
precisely,  obliged)  to accept. 
The  view that workers are only  temporarily  trapped into low-paid 
jobs rests on  the two  propositions that  i)  they are free  to vacate 
their jobs and  ii) that  they  can obtain access  to higher pay by 
competing  for a  wide  range of jobs.  Whilst  the first proposition - 53  -
generally holds  the second does not.  As  a  general rule the only serious 
contender for  any  job is its incumbent until he  chooses  to quite.  But 
even when  vacant  the job is not  open  to all contenders and  the higher 
its pay  and  status the more  carefully is entry to it controlled. 
Moreover  the rule of exclusion operates at all levels and  is 
reinforcing.  The  very limited access  each labour market  group has  to 
better jobs encourages  them  to more  carefully protect those within their 
control.  Thus  the only jobs that are open  to all are those  that no  one 
wants.  Neo-classical theorists recognise  the existence of such 
inflexibilities but  regard  them as exceptional,  imperfections in a  world 
that works  approximately in line with their a  priori notions of its 
operation.  However  careful empirical investigation of the  labour 
markets  shows  non-competing  groups  to be  the rule rather than  the 
exception. 
The  notion that in the  long  run  labour is in short  supply rests on 
equally shaky  foundation.  Experience suggests that labour in the  long 
run is in more  or less abundant  supply and  that the general level of 
employment  is demand  determined.  If the demand  for  labour rises above 
its "normal"  level the  labour input of the  core  labour force  can be 
increased by  an  increase in the hours worked,  by  taking up 
under-utilised labour,  by upgrading workers  trapped in jobs below their 
potential by promotion rules and  other institutionalised systems  for 
rationing scarce good  jobs and  by  retraining.  Supplies  can also be 
generated  from  outside the  core  labour force  - by  immigration,  internal 
migration  from  traditional sectors such as agriculture and  by an 
increase in labour market participation,  in particular,  by married women 
and  by workers  acquiring second  jobs. - 54  -
Workers  brought  into the  labour market at the height of the boom 
tend to be paid very  low wages  indeed  (Amstrong  1966)  as they tend  to 
replace workers  upgraded  from  the  secondary to the primary sector. 
However  as unemployment  increases this process is reversed and  the newly 
recruited workers  tend to be ejected from  the  labour market  or remain  to 
intensify the  competition for  jobs with the workers  shunted back from 
the primary sector  (Wilkinson  1981). 
The  structuring of the  labour market,  which  seriously limits 
workers  job opportunity independently of their acquired or potential 
skills,  and  the absence of any  long run constraint on  the  labour supply, 
so that employment  in  the short and  long  run is demand  determined means 
that the market provides no  lower limit to wages.  In these 
circumstances  there is no  need  to cut  social security to provide 
incentives to work;  increased opportunities to work will expand  the 
labour force. 
Institutional and  Social Regulation of Wages 
The  social mechanism underpinning the real wages  was  elegantly 
described by  the Webbs  when  considering the  19th Century  labour market. 
"Over  a  large part of the industrial field,  the wage-earners 
cling with stubborn obstinacy to certain customary  standards of 
expenditure.  However  overpowering may  be  the strategic strength of 
the  employer,  however  unorganised and  resourceless may  be  the 
wage-earners,  it is found  to be  impossible  to  reduce  the wages  and 
other conditions of particular grades of workmen  below a  certain 
vaguely defined  standard.  In the years of worst  trade,  when 
thousands  of  engineers or boilermakers,  masons  or plumbers,  are 
walking  the streets in search of work,  the most  grasping employer Thus: 
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knows  that it is useless for him  to offer them work  in their 
respective trades at ten or fifteen shillings a  week.  Sooner  than 
suffer such violence  to their feelings of what  is fit and  becoming 
to their social position,  they will work  as unskilled labourers,  or 
pick up  odd  jobs,  for  the  same,  or even  lower earnings  than  they 
refuse as  craftsmen.  This  stubborn refusal to  render their 
particular class of service for a  wage  that strikes them  as 
outrageously below their customary  standard,  does  not  depend  on 
their belonging to a  Trade Union,  for it is characteristic of 
unionists and  non-unionists alike,  and  is found  in trade in which 
no  combination exists." pp.693-4. 
"To  the modern  observer it is obvious  that the existence,  among  all 
the workmen  of a  particular grade,  of an identical notion as  to 
what  amount  and kind of weekly  expenditure constitutes subsistence, 
is in itself equivalent  to a  tacit combination.  It is,  in fact 
however it may  have  come  about,  an incipient Common  Rule,  supported 
by  a  universal and  prolonged refusal to work,  which is none  the 
less a  strike in that it is unconcerted and undeliberate.  If every 
artisan, without  the slightest concern with his fellows,  is 
possessed by  an unreasoning prejudice that he  and his family must 
consume  wheaten bread,  butcher's meat,  beer,  and  tea,  instead of 
living on  oatmeal,  maize,  potatoes,  and water,  the  employer will 
find it useless to suggest that "any meal is better than none."  He 
quickly discovers that if he offers wages  which will provide only 
the cheaper  food,  no  individual of the class that he  requires will - 56  -
accept his situation.  He  is,  in fact,  face  to face with what  is 
virtually a  universal strike." pp.696-7. 
Increasingly trade unions  have  given institutional form  to the 
"incipient Connnon  Rule"  and  institutional wage  determination has become 
widespread.  However  labour markets have  always been structured to  some 
extent  and  the higher the skill and  status of the workers  the more 
organised and protected their position:  professional associations are 
the most  effective craft unions  and  have  always  been with us.  Moreover, 
those parts of the  labour market where workers are continually thrown 
into competition have generally been  those typified by  low  pay  and  the 
most  degrading working  conditions.  The  historical tendency has been  the 
extension of  trade unionism to reduce  the unregulated section.  But  this 
process has not been  complete  and  a  significant section of  the manual 
worker  labour force is not  organised.  However  the institutionalisation 
of  labour markets has not been confined  to trade union activities. 
Growing  concern about  conditions in the unregulated section of the 
labour market  led to  the  imposition of legal minimum  wages.  Even  so a 
significant proportion of the  labour force still remains  outside the 
effective control of trade unions  and  legal controls and  some  parts 
within the organised sector and  particularly those  covered by minimum 
wage  legislation are  low paid.  On  the other hand  the progressive 
extension of  the  coverage of social security has  constructed a  floor of 
minimum  income  levels which however  low  has  reduced  to some  extent 
competition in the  low paid area of the labour market. 
The  family  structure is also an  important  influence on  labour 
market behaviour.  Much  of wage  analysis proceeds on  the unspecified 
assumption that behaviour is individualistic, or that families  typically - 57  -
rely on  the earnings of a  single breadwinner.  However  a  switch of 
emphasis  to an analysis of the  family  rather than  individual 
subsistence,  requires  increasing attention to be paid  to  family 
structure and  lifetime patterns of expenditure and  income.  Moreover  the 
existence of  family  subsistence is important in explaining the  labour 
market position of members  of the  family other than the principal wage 
earner.  If the  family has  a  target  income  and if family members  have 
access  to family  subsistence provided by  the principal wage  earners then 
the  supply price of the subsidiary earners might be quite independent of 
their individual needs  or their productivity.  This is particularly true 
where,  as in most working class families,  a  very high proportion of 
income  is pre-empted by essentials and  any margin  above  this has high 
priority because it is this increment which  provides  the  luxury. 
The  relationship between  the  supply price of  labour and  family 
subsistence is not  confined to earned  income  - it also applies  to social 
welfare.  To  an  important extent  the provision of adequate social 
security provision is an  important  complement  to institutional wage 
determination in maintaining acceptable living standards.  The  problem 
of  low  pay exists at least partly because of the number  of workers 
obliged to seek work at almost  any wage.  Protection of family  living 
standards therefore requires both minimum  wages  to prevent  employment  at 
earnings below that level and  the elimination of the need  to accept  low 
wages  by  improving  social welfare benefits.  On  the other hand  the 
problem of  low pay  cannot be  solved only  through policies to reduce 
family  poverty.  Even  if minimum  acceptable living standards  could be 
secured for all families without  recourse  to  low paid employment  - and 
this objective is in itself extremely difficult to achieve  - many - 58  -
families will rightly strive to  r~ise their living standards above  that 
minimum,  and  the problem of supplies of  low  paid labour available for 
exploitation on  the  labour market will continue.  Moreover  the  common 
assumption that the social security systems  provide an automatic  floor 
to wage  levels does  not  apply when  the eligibility for social security 
payments is effectively limited to unemployed  male breadwinners in 
single wage  earner households.  Provided  there is at least one  family 
member  earning a  full week's wage  there is usually a  financial  incentive 
for other family members  to accept any wage  level as  they are not 
eligible for  social security.  It is also not clear that it is social 
security that provides  the floor to  the wage  level rather than vice 
versa.  As  long as  the ethos of society requires that people  should be 
encouraged  to work  and be  rewarded  for working,  unregulated and  low 
wages  on  the  labour market make  it politically difficult to increase the 
level of social security payments,  and  families  of  the unemployed  or 
sick may  as a  consequence be kept  in absolute poverty even when  there is 
no  employment  available to  them. 
The  forces maintaining wages  in the  labour market  are  therefore the 
acceptable minimum  standards of living which are protected by  social 
convention and worker organisation and  supported by  the social security 
systems rather than  the working of supply and  demand  on  the  labour 
market  supposed by neoclassical theorist.  Policies designed  to lower 
these institutional floors  for wages  are thus directed against the 
forces  that protect workers'  standards of living and  prevent further 
exploitation of workers  in the  labour market.  But  arguments which break 
the  link between wages  and  labour market  clearing are not  sufficient to - 59  -
establish that a  reduction in wages will not increase employment,  this 
question is explored in the next  sections. 
Employment  effects of reducing wages 
The  employment  effect of a  reduction in low  pay  depends  on  the 
elasticity of demand  for products  and  services produced by  low  paid 
workers,  the substitutability between processes employing  low paid 
workers  for  those employing high paid,  and  the substitutability of high 
paid for  low  paid workers.  Studies  show  the  low paid to be concentrated 
in low paid occupations dispersed throughout all types of industries and 
firms,  in low  paying industries and  in low paid firms  in otherwise well 
paid industries.  If attention is first concentrated on  existing 
concentration of  low  pay  the employment  creating prospects for a 
reduction in low  income  levels  seems  limited. 
A reduction in the pay  levels of  low  paid occupations dispersed 
throughout  industry is unlikely to have  a  significant employment  effect. 
Marginal,  ancilliary and  feminised  occupations are  low paid throughout 
the industrial structure primarily because of the existence of  low  paid 
labour for  such  jobs as cleaning,  catering,  packing and  typing  and  not 
because of serious cost constraints on  the  firms  concerned.  Such 
workers provide usually a  small minority  in a  firms  labour force  and are 
unlikely to be  close substitutes for  the main  labour force. 
Consequently  the  demand  for their services is unlikely to be price 
elastic.  However  they are eaa,ily separable  from  the main  labour force 
and  firms wishing  to cut  costs frequently put  their services out  to 
sub-contractors  to break the link between the high paid of their primary 
labour force  and  the cost of ancilliary services.  A reduction in the 
pay for  such jobs could  increase the pressure on  firms  to contract  them - 60  -
out.  But  the effect of this is more  likely to be  a  general downward 
pressure on  the pay  in these occupations rather than  any  substantial 
increase in employment. 
The  low  paying industries tend  to be  the traditional industries -
clothing,  textiles,  cutlery etc.  - which produce  goods which  in overall 
terms  are probably not particularly price elastic.  However,  many  of 
these industries,  are,  throughout  Europe,  and particularly in Britain 
under substantial pressure. from  imports and  the demand  for domestic 
goods  could be  sensitive to costs.  Therefore a  cut in wage  costs could 
have  a  significant employment  effect.  It is also possible that a 
reduction in wages  could benefit marginal firms which  pay  low wages 
because  they are inefficient or because  they  employ  obsolete  technology. 
A lowering of  the floor of earned and  State provided  income  could 
also foster new  forms  of industrial organisation.  There is an 
increasing  tendency  throughout  the advanced  capitalist world  for  firms 
to  sub-contract an  increasing proportion of their functions.  The 
reasons  for this are explored in a  separate paper but  the availability 
of  cheap  labour is a  contributory factor.  There is evidence  from Italy 
that  the growth  of sub-contracting led the  to emergence of a  small firm 
sector which  secured its independence  from  large firms  and  developed new 
techniques and  products. 
The  links between family  subsistence and  the  supply price of 
subsidiary wage  earners  could also lead to a  restructuring of  employment 
if family  incomes were  reduced.  Unemployment,  short  time working  and 
the downgrading  of  the princi.pal wage  earners, which would  be 
exacerbated by wage  cuts and  reduction in social security provisions, 
put  increasing pressure on  subsidiary wage  earners and  desperate - 61  -
attempts  to maintain family  could  increase the supply of  low  paid 
workers  and  lower their supply price.  Statutory rules designed  to 
prohibit or limit the receipt of social welfare payments  to the 
economically active will exacerbate the problem.  Limits  on  earnings of 
social security recipients encourages  the growth of "black" employment 
where wages  are low,  abuses of  the  law difficult to regulate and where 
the possibility of exploitation of labour is enhanced.  This may  pose 
problems  even  in booms,  but  then  incomes  are high and  rising and  the 
underlying poverty which lies at the heart of exploitation is being 
reduced.  On  the other hand,  in recession when  unemployment  is high, 
poverty increasing and  social welfare  threatened by  government 
expenditure cuts and  the growing  tax burden as  the fiscal base of the 
economy  contracts,  the black economy  become  an  important alternative 
source of  income. 
However,  the major effect of sub-contracting and  the growth of the 
black economy  has been  to re-structure rather than  expand  employment  and 
there are no  reasons  to believe an  increase in sub-contracting motivated 
by wage  reduction would  have  any  other effect. 
Another possible expansion of employment  if labour was  available at 
lower prices is the service sector.  Traditionally domestic  and  personal 
services  such as retailing, distribution and  the repair of cars  and 
domestic appliances have acted as  a  sponge  to absorb  the unemployment 
displaced  from manufacturing and it is frequently  argued  that this is 
being prevented in the current recession by  the high price of  labour. 
There is no  doubt  that if the price of labour fell sufficiently there 
would  be  a  growth of such  services.  But whether this would  be 
economically meaningful or just disguised unemployment  is questionable. - 62  -
There is a  limited demand  for personal services and  the demand  for 
services will decline as  income  at all levels are reduced  by  recession. 
If workers were  driven by  economic necessity to offer services the 
demand  for which is inelastic then this would  merely distribute the 
limited job opportunities thinly amongst  a  growing  flow of suppliers. 
But  there is a  limit to this and moreover  the  long period of decline of 
the provision of personal services has drastically reduced  the demand. 
Labour intensive laundries and dry cleaners have been  replaced by  coin 
in the slot laundramatics,  changes  in retailing to the super- and 
hyper-market mode  have drastically increased its capital intensity and, 
moreover,  domestic  labour has become  increasingly mechanised  and 
therefore the potential demand  for servants is much  reduced.  Perhaps 
the availability of  cheap  labour might  reverse these  trends but this 
would be a  long  term,  rather than short term prospect. 
Thus whilst it cannot be denied that pay cuts and  the reduction of 
social security would  have  a  positive employment  effect in the absence 
of any  significant increase in effective demand  (when  employment  would 
increase without  pay cuts)  the major  impact would  be a  re-shuffling of 
existing jobs and  the spreading of existing work over more  workers.  But 
this gain needs  setting against  the economic  and  social costs of a 
regressive redistribution of  income. 
The  Anti-Sweating  league and  other pressure groups who  fought  for 
the establishment of minimum  wages  argued against  those who  opposed  such 
a  policy,  on  the grounds  of the negative employment  effect that jobs are 
not worth having unless their wages  provide at least for  the minimum 
consumption  requirements of the worker  employed  for a  normal working 
week.  Otherwise  the worker would  need  to be  subsidised by either the - 63  -
state or the  family  and  this would  in effect be a  subsidy  to  the 
partially parasistic low  pay  employer.  It was  further argued that if 
legislation enforcing  the payment  of wages  sufficient to  cover minimum 
consumption  standards eliminates jobs,  then this was  a  measure of  the 
low value of  the  jobs to society.  But  where  jobs were  low  paid because 
of the disadvantaged position of the workers  employed,  wage  protection 
would  serve mainly  to reduce exploitation. 
The  force  of  the argument  that jobs  should not be  contemplated 
which  cannot  provide minimum  consumption  standards lies not only in the 
compelling considerations of social justice but also in the possible 
impact of the  employment  of  cheap  subsidised labour on  the structure and 
stability of product markets  and  production~  The  negative effects of 
the employment  of  low wage  labour on  the stability,  growth and  rate of 
technical  change  in industry is the obverse of the  argument  that high 
wages  stimulates  innovation,  technical change  and  efficiency.  Low  wages 
which  for  one  reason or another bear no  relationship to potential 
productivity provide an  independent basis on  which  firms  can  compete  and 
on which  secondary industries,  firms  and  technologies  can thrive. 
Unregulated  low wage  employment  destabilises product markets,  increases 
uncertainty and risk,  slows  down  the rate of scrapping and  consequently 
reduces  the level of new  investment,  and  the profitability of new 
investment  in high wage  firms.  Therefore  the  case for or against wage 
reductions  extends beyond  a  consideration of its impact  on  workers  and 
employers  (potential and  actual)  in the  low wage  sector.  Attention must 
be paid to the effect of unregulated employment  on  the modern,  high wage 
employment  sectors which  should provide  the basis for  industrial growth 
and  stable,  secure employment. - 64  -
The  disruptive effect of competition based on wage  cutting is 
recognised by  employers whose  association enforce minimum  wages  in an 
attempt  to "take wages  out of competition".  Employers  often prefer the 
institutional regulation of wages within an  industry as it limits unfair 
competition in the product market based  on  low  wage  "sweated labour"  and 
they demonstrate this preference by joining employers'  associations.  In 
this respect  the National Federation of Self  Employed  and  Small Business 
Ltd.,  a  major pressure group  for eliminating minimum  wages  in Britain, 
entirely misinterpreted the debates  over  the abolition of Wages  Councils 
in the  1960s  and  1970s.  (WFSESB  1981).  The  Federation suggests that the 
Department  of Employment  was  unwilling to consider applications for 
abolition from  employers.  Infact,  in all the abolition cases that we 
are aware  of the main  opposition to abolition came  from  the  employers 
whose  main  concern was  the prevention of destructive competition. 
Summary  and  conclusions 
The  neo-classical argument  that a  reduction of real wages  increases 
employment  depends  crucially on  Say's Law;  that any  reduction in 
effective demand  resulting from  a  cut  in real wages will be offset by  an 
increase in consumption or saving  (and hence,  according to orthodox 
economics,  investment)  from profits.  Keynes,  however,  believed this not 
to be  the case  and  after a  careful study in chapter  19  of  the General 
Theory  concluded  that  the most  likely effect of a  cut  in real wages 
would  be  a  contraction in aggregate  income.  From  the Keynesian 
standpoint,  the level of employment  is determined not by  the labour 
market,  but by  the level of effective demand.  In conditions of 
Keynesian unemployment  - which provides  the clearest understanding of 
the current high level of unemployment  in Western  Europe  - the level of - 65  -
income,  both individual or aggregate,  is not easily explained in  terms 
of worth or need. 
The  basis of orthodox wage  theory is that the  labour market by 
rationing scarce  labour ensures  individual workers are paid their worth 
in terms  of productivity.  However  the notion that labour is scarce, 
except in the very short period,  receives little historical support. 
Periods of  growth have witnessed the mobilisation of labour,  which,  as 
far as  the advanced industrial sector is concerned,  was  previously 
unutilized or underutilized.  Such  periods of  economic  advance  have 
witnessed mass  internal and  international migration and significant 
social change,  including changes  in the family,  which have  increased 
activity rates of existing populations.  Moreover  the  taking up  of 
surplus labour has not  been only quantitative.  With  economic  expansion, 
expanding  job opportunities in higher grades  and  improved  education and 
training has  resulted in upgrading of industrial labour.  Thus  the 
labour force  in the advanced  sectors is demand  rather than supply 
determined. 
However  the process of  the adjustment  of human  resources  to 
increased demand  is by  no  means  smooth.  Newcomers  to the  labour force 
tend to be  confined  to  the jobs with poor working  conditions,  low  pay 
and  limited prospects.  This  can be explained by  lack of training, 
racial and  sexual prejudice,  effective organisation amongst  primary 
workers,  and,  in the case of women,  by  constraints resulting from 
domestic duties.  Thus  typically labour markets are structured with 
newcomers  confined with traditionally disadvantaged  groups  to marginal 
occupations,  with limited earnings opportunities. - 66  -
In periods of economic  crisis the process of up-grading is reversed 
and  labour markets are restricted with the marginalisation of weakly 
organised workers  and  the expulsion of marginal workers.  In the first 
instance the costs of crisis are borne mainly by  secondary workers. 
However,  the growing crisis intensifies competition as desperation 
forces  firms  to cut prices and worsen  the  terms  upon  which workers are 
employed.  In  these  circumstances  income  maintenance is an  important 
element  in controlling competition and  preventing a  progressive decline 
in wages  and working conditions,  a  principle effect of policy aimed at 
wide  spread wage  cutting accompanied  by  reduction in social security 
would  exacerbate  the  economic  and  social costs of recession.  In  such 
periods  the  growing availability of workers prepared to work  for  low  pay 
coincides with growing  competitiveness on  firms  encouraging a 
restructuring of production to avoid previously established minima  in 
wages  and working conditions.  Thus  a  form  of Gresham's  law operates 
with  low wages  and  bad  employment  practices driving out  the good. 
The  concentration of the worst effects of crisis on  those least 
able  to protect themselves may  have an  important political stabilising 
effect.  It allows  the more  powerful in society to resolve their 
differences by providing  them  collectively with a  higher proportion of 
total resources.  The  evidence is that during the crisis of the 1970's 
the West  German  economy  has  concentrated the cost by ~xpelling foreign 
workers  and  by  restructuring the  domestic  labour force  to exclude 
domiciled  immigrants,  women,  the disabled,  the young  and  the old from 
the primary labour market.  This has been achieved by upgrading  the 
qualification level of the primary workers with little or no  evidence of 
an  increased  job  content  and with the  compliance if not  the active - 67  -
participation of the German  trade union movement.  There is abundant 
evidence  that this process is observable in all advanced  capitalist 
economies  and  there is no  doubt  that the abandenment  of policies for 
maintaining  low  income  would  accelerate this trend.  This is the reality 
underlying the rhetoric of neo-classical theoreticians.  However,  apart 
from  the social and moral considerations,  stabilisation by  increasing 
inequalities will almost  certainly be  counter productive.  It is argued 
in an  accompanying  paper that the driving force  of inflation is the 
reduction in living standards and  one  of the  important  features of 
recent  developments has been  the  growth of organisation amongst  the  low 
paid.  A permanent  reduction in the real income  at the  lower  end  of  the 
scale would  require a  destruction of this organisation and  this would  be 
extremely socially devisive  (as  the dirty job strikes in Britain in 1979 
demonstrated).  But  even if this could be  achieved  temporarily,  history 
shows  that  the  inclusion of previously excluded  groups  into the 
bargaining process over  economic  resources,  status and  power  is a  major 
feature of modern  development  in capitalist and also socialist 
economies.  This process  can be halted or even set back in the  short  term 
but  even  then only at significant economic  and  social costs,  but the 
cost of permanently reversing this historical process is unthinkable. Inflation 
Introduction 
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Inflation has become  an  increasingly intractable problem over  the 
post war period,  a  process paralleled by  the development  of theories of 
inflation and by policies to reduce  inflation.  Most  of  these theories 
can be classified as  demand  pull/monetarist,  or cost-push;  consequently 
policies to reduce  inflation have either deflated demand  or attempted to 
directly control money  income  or both.  An  alternative explanation of 
the inflationary process is that rising prices result from  struggles 
over the distribution of real income  between  and  amongst  wage  earners 
and profit takers.  This latter analysis has not yet had  a  serious 
influence on  policy makers,  and  consequently the implications of  the 
distributional approach  for  the effectiveness of orthodox 
anti-inflationary policies has not  received wide  consideration.  But 
they  do  suggest  that  orthodox policies will not only be  ineffective but 
will even intensify the inflationary process. 
The  purpose of this paper is to argue  that the distribution 
approach raises major doubt  aboutconventDnal anti-inflationary policies 
and  to suggest areas  for policy-orientated research on  the  inflationary 
process.  Section one briefly summarises  the  orthodox theories of demand 
and  cost-push inflation and  links these with anti-inflationary policies. 
Section  two  outlines  the distributional approach,  contrasting it with 
orthodox theories.  Section three  examines  the  impact  of orthodox 
anti-inflation policies in a  world where  inflation results primarily 
from  distributional conflict.  The  final section considers the factors 
which  can be  expected to modify or intensify  inflation when 
it  is mainly explained by  distributional struggles.  These - 69  -
considerations need  to be  taken into account  in designing anti-inflation 
policies and also in formulating general economic policies. - 70  -
1.  Orthodox theories of inflation 
1.1  Theories of excess  demand 
By  the  1970s Keynesian  demand-pull  theories of inflation, based  on 
the Phillips'  curve  trade-off between  inflation and  unemployment,  had 
given way  to monetarist  theories of excess money  demand  which provided 
an  explanation for inflation even  whenunemp1o~t  was  rising sharply. 
In the post-war period up  to  the 1970s  there had also been a  marked 
evolution in Keynesian  demand-pull  theories.  During  the  1950s  the 
predominant view amongst  economists was  that inflation resulted from 
excess  demand  in the product market.  In the  1960s  the emphasis  shifted 
to excess  demand  in the  labour market  and  the apparent  trade-off between 
wage  inflation and  unemployment.  The  monetarist explanations,increasing 
popular  in the  1970s, argued that inflation was  a  wholly monetary 
phenomenon  and  independent of  labour market  conditions  (Horsmann  ). 
The  policy recommendations  of both Keynesian  and monetarist  demand 
theories of inflation are deflation,  the  former  concentrating mainly  on 
fiscal,  and  the latteron monetary restraint.However for Keynesian 
demand-pull  theories  the  co-existence of high rates of inflation and  low 
levels of effective demand  and  rising unemployment  rates  provided a 
real dilemma,  and  by  the 1970s  few  previous adherents  to orthodox 
Phillips'  curve analyses continued  to advocate deflationary policy as 
the main  means  to curb  inflation.  Already in the 1960s  economists had 
been working with  integrated demand-pull  and  cost-push theories of 
inflation.  Under  these approaches  the excess demand  for  labour  combined 
with extra bargaining power  conferred on  the  trade unions  in periods of 
high labour demand  to bid up  wages.  Trade union strength was  thus a 
function  of the level of demand,  and  the position and  shape of the - 71  -
Phillip's curve relationship was  in part determined by  trade union 
behaviour.  Trade union militancy was  identified as a  major obstacle to 
the achievement of non-inflationary full employment  by  demand-management 
alone.  To  explain the apparent breakdown of  the Phillips'  relationship 
in the late 1960s,  some  Keynesians used  the demand-pull/cost-push 
variant to suggest  that  the position of  the Phillips'  curve was  no 
longer stable because of  a  general increase in the level of  trade union 
militancy which was  pushing  the curve  away  from  the origin increasing 
the rate of inflation associated with each level of unemployment.  This 
increase in militancy was  itself considered a  function of the higher 
level of employment  throughout  the post-war period  (Phelps Brown  ). 
The  policy recommendation was  for an  incomes  policy to shift the 
Phillips'  curve  to the left to provide more  flexibility for 
macro-economic policies.  However  with the  continuous  change  in the 
Telationship between inflation and unemployment  in the 1970s it was 
increasingly accepted that  the Phillips relationship had broken  down  and 
not just shifted position. 
For  the monetarists a high rate  of inflation with rising 
unemployment  was  no  dilemma  as for  them  inflation is determined entirely 
by  monetary  demand  and  not by  conditions in the labour market.  Friedman 
developed  the  expectations - augmented Phillips'  curve which  located the 
cause of  the acceleration in inflation rates in mistaken belief that 
there was  a  long  term trade-off between  inflation and  unemployment. 
Monetarists advocated deflationary policies,  controlling the  supply of 
money  arguing  that this would  have no  long  term effect on  the 
utilization of  resources which were  determined  exclusively by  market 
forces.  As  inflation is caused by  excess money,  monetarists  see no  role - 72  -
for  incomes  policies.  Some  economismof  the monetarist persuasion have 
however  advocated  incomes policies or trade union controls to  smooth  the 
transition to  lower rates of inflation determined by  the appropriate 
monetary policies  (Scott  ). 
1.2  Cost  push  theories  of  inflation 
Cost-push theories of inflation developed  in parallel with 
demand-pull  theories.  The  breakdown of  the Phillips'  curve  led to the 
ascendancy of both cost-push and monetarist theories of inflation.  In 
the pure  cost-push models  of inflation the  impetus  to inflation comes 
from  autonomous  cost-increases,  generated by  import  pYice  rises, 
increase in taxes,  increases in profit mark-up  or,  more  commonly,  from 
increases in money  wages  generated by  trade union bargaining power 
considered  to be  independent of the level of demand  in the  labour 
market.  In a  period of persistent inflation the initial impetus  to  the 
inflationary process becomes  unclear and  the definition of cost-push 
inflation has been  extended to include situations where  pressures  from 
the cost-side not easily modified by  deflationary economic  policy 
maintain inflation whatever its initial cause. 
There are a  wide variety of cost-push models,  and  there has  been no 
consistent evolutionary pattern of development  of these theories,  except 
perhaps  a  more  recent  tendency  to emphasise "real wage  resistance" as 
the basis of wage  bargaining which blurs the distinction between 
cost-push and  conflict theories of inflation.  There are three basic 
types of cost-push  theories of wage  inflation:  those which  assumethat 
wage  claims are initiated by workers'  greed or dissatisfaction with 
their lot;  those in which workers  customary  standard of living or - 73  -
expected  increase in their standard of living is reduced  through price 
rises,  and  those in which workers make  money  wage  claims  in order to 
maintain or improve  their relative position in a  wage  hierarchy. 
The  causes of wage-wage  and wage-price spirals can be many  and 
various.  For wage-wage  spirals one  group  may  press  for  improved 
relative wages  because of real or perceived differences  in their labour 
market  position or because  they consider themselves  to be relatively 
underpaid.  These  reasons  for  changes  in customary differentials are not 
accepted by other groups  and  a  wage-wage  spiral results.  Similarly the 
inflationary process may  be set in motion  by  a  high increase in sectors 
with relatively high rates of productivity growth  and  the  force  of 
customary differentials generalises the increases  throughout  the 
economy.  The  price increases that  could  stimulate  a  price-wage spiral 
could  stem from  higher  taxes on  profits or sales, higher  import prices 
or higher profits,  or alternatively the wage-price spiral could be 
initiated by autonomous  claims  for higher money  wages  to increase real 
wages  or to restore real disposable  income  reduced  by  tax increases. 
These  explanations of cost-inflation are based on  actual changes  in 
differentials,  real income  levels,  or in the acceptable level of real 
wages.  In periods of persistent inflation, however,  inflationary 
expectations may  come  to play a  part by  some  cost-push theorists  (Wood 
Pemberton  ).  As  inflation becomes  the norm,  it is anticipated by 
bargaining groups who  build into their wage  claim an  increase not  only 
sufficient to bring them  up  to acceptable current levels but  to provide 
some  margin against expected inflationary erosion of  the absolute or 
relative value of their wages.  As  each bargaining group's main  objective 
is to protect their own  interests,  and  as at the  time  they bargain they - 74  -
have not direct  information on  the level of wage  increases other groups 
will achieve,  or the rate of price  increas~  they have  a  strong 
incentive to treat experienced inflation as  a  minimum  and predict an 
acceleration in that rate.  In these circumstances inflationary 
expectations based  on  imperfect knowledge  act as an autonomous  force 
increasing wage  costs.  In such circumstances  incomes  policies may  be 
particularly efficacious by  providing additional information as  to  the 
wage  increase normand  they may  succeed  in reducing  the generally 
self-fulfilling inflationary expectations.  In this view inflation 
results not  from  fundamental  conflict over the distribution of resources 
but  from  inefficiencies in the bargaining and  information systems; 
consequently the inflation can be readily brought under control if trade 
unions agree  to centralisation and  synchronisation of bargaining. 
Incomes  policies that are expected not just to moderate 
inflationary expectations but also to  resolve real conflicts over 
relative positions in a  wage  hierarchy or over real income  levels are 
clearly much  less certain to be  successful.  However  perhaps  the main 
difference between  cost-push theorists and  conflict  theoris~is the 
conflict 
belief of  the  former  that  such hver relative or real income  levels 
should,  and  moreover  can be,  resolved within the constraints of the 
current availability of resources for  consumption whatever  the level. 
This  requires that workers  should be prepared to accept  the level of 
real  income  that  remains after the prior claims of profits,  imports and 
the government  sector.  Implicit in this approach is a  strongly held 
belief that  there is some  overall structure of relative pay which is 
independent of the absolute level of real pay which workers will find 
acceptable provided certain areas of excess union  strength can be - 75  -
brought under control.  For cost-push theorists who  believe workers  are 
primarily concerned about  the absolute level of real wages,  the current 
economic  decline of the  UK  creates fundamental  problems  for  any 
optimistic belief in an efficacious  incomes  policies.  Whereas  in the 
late 1950s  and  early 1960s it might  have been possible to  claim that the 
wage-price spiral was  initiated by trade unions making  exogenous  and 
excessive claims  for higher real wages,  and  that  incomes  policies were 
necessary to contain  such excesses,  it is now  clear that since the mid 
1960s it has been more  a  question of trade unions defending  customary 
real wage  levels in successive periods of increasingly serious economic 
decline.  Within  the context of a  depressed  and  declining economy,  the 
likelihood of real conflict over the distribution of resources 
increases,  and it is this change  in the economic  climate which occurred 
earlier in Britain than in other EEC  countries that has  led to  the 
development  of theories which  located the  cause of inflation in the 
struggle over real resources. 
2.  Distributional conflict and  the inflationary process 
Conflict theories of inflation direct attention to  the resources 
available to meet wage  claims and  the demands  made  upon  these  resources 
by profits,  the foreign  sector and  the government.  Inflation results if 
the resources available are not sufficient to meet  the real resource 
claims made  by  these sectors.  Inflation is a  phenomenon  caused by  real 
conflict and  by  real shortages of available resources.  It cannot 
therefore be  'solved'  by  reforms  of apparently inefficient institutional 
procedures for wage  determination,  or by  providing an  improved 
information  system of the rate of price or money  wage  changes  in the 
economy. - 76  -
In fact far  from  inflation being considered an  indicator of 
inefficiency in the institutional set-up of  the economy,  it might  in at 
least certain periods in certain economies be  considered an essential 
escape valve:  a  means  by which  differences  can be resolved without 
damage  to  the  functioning of the economy.  When  wage  bargains  are 
made,  they are agreed  in monetary  terms,  and neither the workers or the 
employers  have precise information about  the real outcome  of the 
bargain.  The  immediate  impact  of a  money  wage  increase may  be to raise 
the price of the firms  product by  the  same  percentage,  but for  the 
workers  concerned this increase does  not  cancel out  the full benefit of 
the wage  increase as  the product will at most  form  a  minor part of their 
bundle of  consumption  goods.  Moreover  the employers will not be certain 
whether demand  for  their product  and  hence  total profits can be 
maintained  in real terms;  this will depend  on  whether  the firm's 
relative price position will be restored by  a  general rise in the 
prices.  This uncertainty over  the outcome  may  allow a  bargain to be 
when,  had 
struck even  I the results of  the bargain  been known  in real terms  in 
advance,there might be no  solution that was  acceptable to both sides. 
Moreover if the outcome  in practice proves unacceptable  then the issue 
can be  reopened  through another wage  negotiation.  In this way,  for 
example,  an  increase in the  tax or import price burden  can be 
continuously shifted between wages  and  profits,  and  of course also 
between bargaining groups who  achieve wage  settlements at different 
times  of  the year. (l)  This  argument  also applies  to conflicts over 
(1)  It had  been  argued  that if all bargaining groups  settled at the 
same  time  for  the same  amount  and  if prices  immediately rose 
everyone would  recognise  the futility of wage  bargaining and  would 
give it up.  However  it is possible  that in these  circumstances 
everyone would  recognise that it was  the restoration of profit 
levels which  reduced  real wages  below their bargained  level rather 
than other wage  bargainins  as  seems  the  case when  groups  settle 
at different  times  of  the year.  This  could concentrate conflict 
between capital and  labour rather  than disperse it in the group 
struggles. - 77  -
relative wages,  although  intra-wage sector conflicts are generally 
considered at least secondary  to real wage  conflicts by  this approach. 
The  'leapfrogging'  process may  be preferable to any  attempt  to establish 
'direct relativity bargaining'  (Wood  ;  Pemberton  )  as bargaining 
groups might be unprepared  to accept publicly a  particular position 
within a  wage  hierarchy,  whereas  they would  be  prepared  to accept  a 
money  wage  bargain which  temporarily  improved  their relative position 
and  which  promised a  permanent  improvement  because of uncertainty about 
the relative bargaining success of other groups. 
Although  the inflation  'escape valve'  allows  compromises  to be 
reached when  there is no  current acceptable solution to the real 
distribution of resources, it can never·theless have  s~vere costs for  the 
economy  and for political stability.  Not  least of these costs is the 
fact  that inflation that results from  conflict is highly likely to 
accelerate.  If workers make  a  real wage  claim in one  round  that they 
fail to realise,  in the next  pay  round  they may  attempt  to make  good 
their shortfall in real wages  during  the previous  two  rounds,  leading to 
higher rates of money  wage  claims.  Moreover  the risks 
will be  the greater the larger the shortfall between  demanded  and 
available real resources. (l) 
(1)  Determined by  demands  of the public sector,  investment,  capitalist 
consumption  and  the  terms  of trade,  and  the rate of  increase in 
productivity. - 78  -
Secondly if inflation results primarily from  the defensive action 
of workers  and  employers  to maintain income  levels,  any  period of 
inflation is liable to  induce relatively unorganised and  weak  groups  to 
develop  a  more  effective defence of their living standards.  The  ability 
of strong groups  to protect their living standard  atthe expense of less 
groups 
well organised/whilst helping to reduce  inflation in the short period is 
not  a  stable situation.  The  more  rapid the erosion in their living 
standards the greater is the likelihood that the weakly organised will 
improve  their organisation.  This spread of effective collective 
bargaining has  a  similar inflationary pressure in the economy  as  an 
increase in militancy amongst  already organised groupB  as  the passing 
on  of wage  and price increases becomes  more  complete,  so inflation 
accelerates  (compare  Phelps Brown's with Wilkinson and  Turner's 
explanation of the late 1960s wage  explosion).  Moreover  these 
developments  in organisation and  collective bargaining are unlikely to 
be  reversed as  organisation and militancy are maintained both by  the 
new  institutions that are  formed  and  by  the educative or learning 
process that employees  go  through in forming organisations or taking 
part in industrial action.  Considerable evidence exists to  show  that 
the probability of further industrial action is very high in 
establishments where  there has been at least one  strike.  This increased 
potential for inflationary pressure is therefore a  permanent  feature of 
the  economy:  and  the price that has  to be paid if weak  groups are not  to 
bear theburden  of wage  and  profit claims  in more  organised sectors. 
There is no  simple solution to inflation resulting from  conflict 
over distribution.  Incomes  policies can only work if they achieve or 
are accompaniedqyapermanent  change  in claims  for real resources made  by - 79  -
wages,  profits,  the  foreign  sector or government  or if real resources 
are  simultaneously expanded.  Moreover  the question about what  is the 
"right" policy becomes  explicitly political: it cannot be  assumed  that 
it is real wages  that  can or should be  suppressed and it may  be  that a 
suppression of profits  (with higher public  investment  to compensate  for 
any  consequent  shortfall in private investment)  is the only way  by which 
an  acceptable  compromise  can be  found within the existing social 
political and  economic  framework.  While conflict theory points to no 
obvious direct anti-inflation policies, it does direct attention to the 
importance of macro-economic  policy and  the availability of real 
resources in containing the  inflationary process.  Other things being 
equal,  distributional conflict will be less severe  the greater the 
availability of resources  for distribution. 
3.  Impact  of orthodox anti-inflation policies on  the inflationary 
process. 
3.1  Monetary/fiscal restraint 
Keynesian  fiscal restraint and monetarist policy designed  to  reduce 
monetary  demand  and  hence prices,  in practice cause  a  reduction in the 
level of activity in the  economy.  For Keynesian  demand-pull  theorists 
the decline in available real resources is the price that has  to be paid 
for  a  reduction in the rate of inflation;  for monetarists the decline in 
activity represents a  movement  back  to equilibrium at the  'natural 
level'  of employment  where  inflation is non-accelerating from  a 
disequilibrium position achieved by  a  mismatch  in capitalist and  workers 
expectations and  sustained by  a  progressive increase in the money 
supply  (although  some  reduction below the natural rate may  be  needed - 80  -
to squeeze inflation out of  the  system).  Moreover  the  transition to 
stable inflation is believed to provide the conditions for  a  larger 
supply of real resources  in the future by  creating an environment 
favourable  to enterprise.  For Keynesians  then inflation control 
requires a  sacrific~ of real resources,  but  for monetarists this 
sacrifice is only of  resources that could make  no  long  term contribution 
to national  income. 
resources,  both monetarist 
If there is conflict over  the distribution of  I  and  Keynesian 
policies are liable to exacerbate the  inflationary problem by  reducing 
the supply of available resources.  Moreover  even if the policy was 
designed  to  improve  long  term growth prospects  through higher investment 
by using deflation to weaken  union power  and  to redistribute income  to 
profits,  experience  shows  that an  increase in the profit share is not 
sufficient to secure  an  increase in investment.  Indeed  the generally 
depressed conditions  induced by  demand  deflation are more  likely to lead  to  a 
reduction in investment  and  thus  to a  long  term decline in the supply of 
available resources. 
Deflation not  only leads to a  reduction in wage  and profit levels 
through  forcing  firms  out of business  and workers  into unemployment  but 
also ~ affecting profits and wages  of firms  and workers  left in 
employment.  If deflation led only to bankruptcy or unemployment  the 
impact  on  the inflationary process might be  reduced because of the 
inherently weak bargaining power  of  firms  and  workers  forced  out of 
economic  activity.  However  it is more  likely that all or the majority 
of  firms will be working at low  levels of capacity utilization, which 
squeezes profit levels by  increasing overhead costs per unit of output 
and by  reducing productivity growth  and  competitiveness  on  the - 81  -
international market  as  investment levels are cut.  This  squeeze  in 
profit levels may  lead firms  to raise prices by  a  higher percentage  than 
wage  increases,  thereby  squeezing real wages.  Workers'  real living 
standards are also likely to be cut because of the higher tax burden in 
recession as  the  tax base  shrinks and  the dependent  population rises. 
Even  if the  tax burden is levied on  firms part at least is likely to be 
passed on  into prices and  thus onto wages.  This  increased tax burden 
can  lead to persistent inflation if it is rejected by both employers  and 
workers. 
One  response  to this tax-burden problem has been  the attempt  to 
combine deflationary policy with a  reduction in  ~ublic sector 
expenditure.  The  cuts in public expenditure have also been  encouraged 
by evidence that increases in the social wage  do  not necessarily reduce 
workers'  claims for real net disposable  income.  It is believed that 
are 
standards of living/perceived to be higher if goods  and  services are 
purchased out of real disposable  income  than if they are paid for out of 
social welfarebudgets  financed by higher  taxes.  There are two  major 
problems with this attempt  to reduce  the pressure on  real wages  by  cuts 
in public expenditure.  First the cuts themselves  induce price increases 
for public sector goods,  further deflation,  rising unemployment,  and  in 
practice a  higher tax burden,  assuming no  cut  1n  unemployment  benefit, 
than if the level of non-transfer public expenditure had been kept 
stable.  Second,  the  impact of changes  in the social wage  on  real wage 
claims is assymetrical.  If the social wage  increases workers  are liable 
to incorporate this increase into their customary real living standards 
without  any  reduction in their expected level of purchases of marketed 
commodities,  and if the  tax burden  increases  to  meet  the costs of - 82  -
higher social wage  they may  well try to pass  on  this  tax burden to 
employers  through money  wage  claims  to restore their real disposable 
incomes.  However  this behaviour does not necessarily imply  that the 
social wage  is not valued;  only that workers are not  content with their 
current living standards and will not necessarily offset increases in 
certain areas by  cuts in others.  But if the social wage  is reduced  and 
market  substitutes have  to be bought  (for example private for state 
nurseries,  or medical and  other welfare charges),  this change will again 
feed  into real wage  claims as customary  standards of living have been 
reduced. (1) 
3.2  Incomes  policies 
Incomes  policies in Britain have generally been used in conjunction 
with deflationary policies,  and  have been directed more  at increases in 
the profit share,  than as measures  in their own  right to establish a 
more  satisfactory long  term system of wage  determination.  Nevertheless 
even  in the  formulation  of  the short  term and  ad  hoc  policies used  in 
Britain,  some  attention has necessarily been paid to devising the kind 
of policy that would  be most  likely to be  considered  'fair'  and 
'acceptable'.  Most  cost push theorists advocate  that incomes  policies 
should be both more  comprehensive  (to include profits as well as wages) 
and more  long  term than in the past.  It is argued  that  incomes  policies 
should be used more  to ensure a  more  consensual and efficient way  of 
determining  income  distribution than as ad hoc  measures  to restrain  wages 
(1)  Similar assymetrical effects apply when  standards of living risedue to 
a  higher exchange rate. - 83  -
as part of a  macroeconomic  deflationary package.  The  various  types  of 
incomes  policies already  implemented  show  that there is no  predominant 
view over what  system of wage  determination is most  likely to secure 
equity and efficiency.  Some  incomes  policies have  stressed equal 
increases for all  (some  flat rate,  some  percentage),  while others have 
stressed the  importance of  allowing wages  to rise in higher productivity 
sectors,  and  in particular to  reward higher labour productivity.  The 
former  set of policies is more  likely to lead to or maintain relative 
equality in wage  differentials between groups  of workers,  while the 
latter is likely to maintain relative shares between wages  and profits 
at the firm level.  The  fact  that all these different types of  incomes 
policies have  failed  is some  evidence that the issue of maintaining 
real wage  levels is of paramount  importance,  as all periodsof  incomes 
policies have  slowed  down  real wage  growth and  led to reductions  in real 
wage  levels for  specific groups  (Tarling and  Wilkinson  1977). 
The  focus  on  the search for  some  form  of acceptable equality in 
relative earnings in incomes  policy has directed attention away  from  the 
effects of  incomes  policies on  real wages.  If one  adopts  the conflict 
model  of inflation an  incomes  policy that  reduces  real wages  will not 
only not  succeed in the long  term but will actually intensify the 
inflationary process.  This occurs  for  two  reasons:  first,  when  the 
incomes  policy finally breaks under pressure  from wage  bargainers, 
claims will be made  in this first period of  'free collective bargaining' 
designed  to restore cuts  in real wages  that occurred over  the whole 
period of incomes  policies.  Money  wage  claims will comprise both 
compensation for  the  increase in prices since  the previous  settlement, 
and  compensation  for shortfalls in customary real wage  levels over - 84  -
previous  settlement periods.  Secondly  incomes  policies,  and  the 
associated decrease in real wages,  change bargaining behaviour. 
Previously unorganised  groups enter into bargaining,  other groups press 
for more  frequent  settlements as  a  means  of restoring real income 
levels,  and both this bunching of the  number  of groups settling and  the 
concentration of real wage  claims  into a  short  time period immediately 
following  the  end  of the  incomes  policy  leads to a  rapid rise in money 
wages  and  consequently in prices.  Moreover  this higher rate of price 
increase may  be built into the system as it forms  the basis for  that 
part of next years wage  claims based  on  cost of  living increases. 
Incomes  policies can and  have had  a  ratchet effect on  the rate of 
inflation. 
The  serious  consequences of ill-thought out  incomes policies have 
not been  considered by  policy makers.  Most  expect  incomes  policies to 
break down,  but believe that at least short  term gains  can be made  which 
will not be offset by  subsequent  events.  It is also  supposed  that if 
wages  increase more  slowly  than prices,  then eventually wage  claims are 
likely to rise again but probably  to  a  lower tate of  increase  than previously 
provided  incomes  policies have  had  some  effect in reducing  the rate of 
price increase:  no  compensation for loss of real wages  over  the period 
of  incomes  policy is expected.  One  area where  policy makers  continually 
hope  to make  costless short  term  gains is in the public sector where 
incomes  policies are usually most  vigorously applied.  However  the 
history of public sector pay  in the  UK  has been a  falling behind in 
income  policy-on periods and  a  catching up  period in policy-off periods 
that causes  considerable strain on  public expenditure budgets in 
individual years as well as  leading to an uneccessary level of - 85  -
industrial dispute  and  disruption of public services.  The  main 
socially beneficial effect of incomes  policy has probably been to 
encourage weaker  groups particularly in the public sector,  to organise 
to defend  their living standards against  the cuts  imposed  by  incomes 
policies and  relatively unrestrained price rises.  Paradoxically this 
effect of  incomes  policies on weaker  groups  is the opposite of that 
claimed for  incomes  policies which were expected  to provide protection 
to the less well  organised groups  and  to  improve  their relative position. 
4.  Policy implications of distributional conflict theories 
If inflation results from  a  shortage of resources  to meet  current 
claims  then  there are three possible types of strategies to modify 
inflationary pressure:  to suppress claims  to real resources on  a  long 
term basis;  to increase total available resources;  to  improve  the 
distribution of current resources and  to attempt  to reorganise society 
to  improve  the standard of life. 
4.1  Supression of  claims  to real xesources 
One  plausible interpretation of monetarist  inspired economic 
policies is that  the prime  purpose is to weaken  trade union power,  to 
reduce the claims to real resources and  to restore managerial 
prerogative in the organisation of production.  The  monetarist policies 
may  achieve this objective through  the consequent  increase in the level 
of unemployment.  In practice these policies have also been backed up  by 
more  direct anti-union policies such as  the  reform of industrial 
relations legislation in the UK,  and  the sacking of the striking air 
traffic controllers in the US.  This weakening of trade union control is - 86  -
also part of  the associated policy of restoring incentives to employers, 
a 
to  induce  increased  investment  and  growth  an~high absolute level of 
income  even if the share going  to labour is permanently  reduced. 
Such  policies,  even if considered politically desirable or 
acceptable,  are unlikely to be successful, particularly in the long 
term.  The  monetarist policies may  achieve a  reduction in labour's 
absolute real wage  claims, but by  pursuing this policy the total amount 
of available resources declines,  so that the gap  between wage  demands 
and  the ability of the economy  to meet  these demands  is more  likely to 
widen  than narrow.  Moreover  there is no  clear evidence yet that such 
policies are successful in moderating real wage  claims,  or that any  such 
reform of bargaining behaviour can be maintained at anything other than 
high or even  increasing unemployment  levels.  Moreover  if permanent 
deflation is used  to control trade unionism it may  take  only a  short 
time before the  controlling impact  of unemployment  is reversed and  the 
result is a  much  more  hostile,  socially,  and  politically divided society 
where  the chances of finding a  workable accommodation  between  labour and 
capital are severely reduced.  In short  these policies are wasteful of 
economic  resources,  socially divisive and  unlikely to succeed. 
4~2  Increased resources 
Clearly an  expansion of the economy  provides  the most  direct means 
of meeting a  shortfall in available real resources.  It is much  easier 
to find  some  agreed means  of sharing out  income  if no  groups are 
expected to cut their customary living standards.  Expansion of the 
economy  also provides more  employment  opportunities,  the most  important 
means  by  which workers  can  lay claim to real income.  An  increase in - 87  -
available employment  affects a  large share of the working population: 
families  the members  of which are all unemployed  and  increas~labour 
market  particip~on by  families partially employed  and  an increase in 
hours of work  and  bonus  payments. 
An  expansion of the economy  is not an  easy panacea for dealing with 
inflation.  Indeed  the fact that such expansion is necessary to moderate 
inflation is a  measure  of how  deeply  embedded  in the economic,  social 
and  political system is the inflationary process.  The  main  reason for 
seeking expansion is not  the control of inflation,  and an inability to 
secure sufficient expansion to achieve full employment  as well as  to 
contain inflation may  be  a  structural characteristic of most  advanced 
societies in the 1980s.  Although this is not  the place to  review the 
options  for  improving  growth prospects it is worth stressing that the 
conflict theory of inflation at least removes  the  spurious objection to 
planning for growth,  that expansion will intensify inflationary 
pressures. 
In  the short  term at least it must  be  expected that whatever  the 
macroeconomic  policy pursued,  the rate of expansion will not be 
sufficient on its own  to eliminate  the risk of accelerating inflation. 
Attention therefore must  be paid to the last strategy,  improvements  in 
the distribution of resources and  changes  in  the organisation of 
society.  These  issues are central to anti-inflation policy even in a 
period of high growth,  as  the way  in which  the  increased resources enter 
the  system,  and which  groups  lay claims  to  them,  clearly has  an 
important  impact  on  the extent  to which  growth will itself limit 
inflationary pressure. - 88  -
4.3  Improved  distribution of  resources  and  changes  in the  organisation 
of  society 
A consideration of  the implications of conflict theory might  give 
tlie 
rise to policies that are narrowly  focussed  on  maintainin~real wages  of 
those currently employed  at the expense  of maintaining adequate  living 
the 
standards  throughout /community,  and  of establishing a  fair and  decent 
society with relatively equal opportunities.  In our view these types of 
policies would  not  only be socially divisive but would  also not  succeed 
in the  long  term objective of  finding  some  means  by which most  groups 
claims for  a  fair standard of life can be accommodated. 
It is possible to advocate  three main  policies designed  to maintain 
the real wages  of  those workers most  strategically placed  and  most 
liable actively to resist cuts. 
1)  Concentration of unemployment  primarily  0n  'secondary'  family 
workers,  ~n women,  the young, the old,  the disabled and  other disadvantage 
groups  such as  immigrants. 
2)  Maintaining real disposable wages  for  those  in employment  by 
cutting the reai benefit level for those out of  employment  and  thereby 
reducing  the  tax burden. 
3)  Reducing  the social wage  and  thereby again  reducing  the tax burden. 
The  first option is difficult to achieve because of segregation and 
segmentation in the employment  structure,  so  that women  workers  and 
coloured workers  do  not usually provide direct substitutes for white 
male workers.  Moreover  concentration of unemployment  on  secondary 
family workers  may  haveeff~ts~posite to  those  suggested.  Real wage 
claims will not  only relate to  workers'  perception of a  'fair reward' 
for effort, but also to  the real standard of living that  they are able - 89  -
to achieve.  Standards of living are determined by  family  income  and  the 
majority of families have multiple wage  earners  (over 50  per cent of 
married women  now  work  in Britain).  If some  family  income  earners lose 
employment  the remaining wage  earner or earners may  seek to make  good 
this loss  through further pressure for  increases in their own  real wage 
levels.  This real living standard argument might help  to explain 
continuing pressure on  money  wage  levels in a  period of recession even 
when  individual real wage  levels do  not appear to have been severely 
cut.  Most  family units will nevertheless have  suffered some  loss of 
income  through unemployment,  short-time working,  cuts in overtime, 
production bonuses  and  the like.  A similar argument  can be made  against 
cutting the social wage;  workers will build in to their wage  claims that 
part of  the lost  social wage  that they made  good  by  purchase of 
market  commodities or services,  and  even  that part for which substitute 
wage  goods  are not purchased  (often because substitutes are not 
available)  may  contribute to workers'  general dissatisfaction with their 
current living standards. 
It could be argued that if these strategies were  to be concentrated 
against  the most  disadvantaged  and  socially isolated groups  then they 
are most  likely to be successful even if morally objectionable.  Thus  if 
the cuts in the social wage  were  concentrated on  the services which are 
most  important  to  the poorest and  least vociferous groups  (social 
security benefits,  facilities for  child custody  and  care,  adult mentally 
handicapped etc), or unemployment  concentrated on  the coloured or 
guest-worker communities,  then there would  be little opposition to  these 
moves  from  organised labour.  Even  if this is the  case,  such policies 
might  create an even more  divided working class and  provide a  sub-group - 90  -
or under class, which,  because it was  excluded  from  the core  labour 
market  and  from·adequate benefits outside the  labour market,  could 
provide a  source of competitive pressure to organised labour if out of 
necessity its members  sought  low paid work in the black economy.  This 
possibility is even clearer with the strategy to cut unemployment 
benefit as  a  means  of maintaining real wages  for those in employment. 
Labour market  theorists of orthodox and non  orthodox persuasion are 
usually agreed that the -level of unemployment  benefits is an  important 
factor in bolstering up  real wages  for  those in employment.  This is a 
socially divisive policy of concentrating the cost of unemployment  and 
inflation is also likely to be  in the  long run  counter-productive as  the 
growing  competition  induced by  deprivation of disadvantage workers 
undermineSthe position of the more  powerfully organised. 
It is considerably easier to identify policies that will intensify 
conflict than policies that  can be relied upon  to reduce conflict.  A 
major problem is that the demands  made  by  groups are unlikely to be 
stable.  Although real wage  claims are based  on  some  notion of a  'fair' 
living standard and  a  'fair'  reward  for effort,  these are only relative 
notions,  relative to what is expected or customary,  or to what is 
believed to be possible.  If workers  change  their perception of what is 
possible,  or if easy opportunities for  improved  real living standards 
present  themselves  (for example  reduced  import prices)  the workers  may 
not only raise their real wage  claims but also their perception of what 
is fair.  What  constitutes a  'fair'  level of profits, or a  'fair' return 
to enterprise is again determined by  custom and practice and  likewise 
subject to upward  revision. 
Some  accommodation  over the distribution of the current product - 91  -
may  be  found  in the short  term but no  permanent  solution can be 
guaranteed because  the  causes of  the conflictrun  deep,  and  each side 
is liable to  reopen  the dispute in the near future.  For workers 
conflict over real wages  is partly a  manifestation of discontent with 
more  fundamental  issues in the organisation of society,  including the 
right to secure  and non-degrading employment,  and  for a  more  permanent 
resolution of  the conflict,  attention must be paid to the establishment 
of a  fairer society. 
The  generalised discussion of the issues does  not at this stage 
allow any  specific proposals to be  formulated but  suggests  the 
principles that  should underlie anti-inflation policy. 
1)  Claims by  labour for real resources are not easily suppressed or 
reduced  and  some  means  of accommodating  these claims must  be  found. 
Policy makers  must  not assume  that  they  can automatically adjust real 
living standards  through  taxes,  exchange  rate changes,  cuts in public 
expenditure or measures  to raise profit mark-ups.  All such policies are 
liable to meet with retaliation. 
2)  A fair society requires not only the maintenance of real wage 
levels but also the maintenance of  the total income  of  family  and  social 
groups,  including  those  in and  out of work. 
3)  Income  maintenance at the  family or social level should not 
however  be at the  expense  of maintaining a  fair reward  for  labour in the 
labour market.  It is at the workplace that conflict over distribution 
between wages  and profits is manifest,  and workers must  be able to 
defend  their real wage  levels.  Moreover  income  maintenance  could not be 
achieved without  successful defence of real wage  levels at the place of 
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4)  Policies designed  to provide greater job  security,  greater 
control over the working  environment  and better protection for  those 
without  employment  may  in the  long  term reduce  the intensity of conflict 
in society,  and  in the  short  term help fill the gap  between~upply and  the 
demand  of resources.  In the  context of the current recession, 
considerable imagination and  innovation would be  required  to  implement 
such policies:  for example  they may  require a  new  approach to collective 
bargaining, at national industry,  or local level,  and  the development  of 
schemes  to provide greater job security at the level of the  labour 
market  than in specific plants or firms. 
5)  All  these policies require the pursuit of a  growth oriented 
macro-economic  policy with high levels of investment and  a  commitment  to 
full employment,  both to provide  the required aggregate  level of real 
resources and  to secure access to these resources by  the majority of the 
populace,  through access  to employment. 